Good Times and Bad Apples
Rebel Recruitment in Crackdown and Truce
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231648 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kolby Hanson (0000-0001-7494-8580, U.S. Naval War College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 807-825 |
| Publication date | 2021-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12555 |
| OpenAlex | W3082623488 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 34 |
Even in long‐running civil conflicts, governments may permit rebels to recruit and gather resources freely during years‐long truce periods. Scholars and policy makers assume that these periods of forbearance allow rebel organizations to gather strength unchecked. Instead, with innovative evidence from five conflict zones in Northeast India, I show how leniency can actually undermine rebel organizations in the long run. Despite rebel leaders' best efforts, safety and comfort attract selfish opportunists who may later desert in battle, defect to the enemy, or abuse civilians. First, I show experimentally that the benefits of leniency disproportionately attract low‐commitment recruits. By sampling in local recruitment hot spots, I gathered nearly 400 likely rebel recruits, testing their motivations with attitudinal questions and a conjoint survey experiment. Second, I conducted dozens of qualitative interviews with rebel leaders, rebel soldiers, and civilian observers, tracking how truce periods altered rebel recruitment and behavioral patterns over time
Adversary · Battle · Computer security · Criminology · Forbearance · Political science · Public relations · Corruption and Economic Development · History · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Psychology
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Recruiting Rebels
One for All? State Violence and Insurgent Cohesion
Inside the Politics of Self-Determination
Organized Violence after Civil War
Alliance Formation in Civil Wars
Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador
The Art of Not Being Governed
Doing Well out of War
Forbearance as Redistribution
The Logic of Collective Action
Understanding Ethnic Violence
The Logic of Violence in Civil War
Information, rebel organization and civil war escalation
Networks and Armies
The Strategies of Terrorism
Divided Armies
Crime and Punishment
The Banality of “Ethnic War
How “Free” is Free Riding in Civil Wars
Information Equivalence in Survey Experiments
The Ontology of “Political Violence
States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders
Recruitment and Allegiance
Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks
The Empiricists' Insurgency
Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War
Who Can Keep the Peace? Insurgent Organizational Control of Collective Violence
Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
Armed politics and the study of intrastate conflict
Explaining Rape during Civil War
Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War
Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War
Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration
Armed Groups and Sexual Violence
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |