Specialization as a Strategy in Legislative Decision-Making

Bibliographic Data

ID6231684
AuthorsLawrence V Grant (corresponding author)
Year1973
Volume17
Issue1
Pages123
Publication date1973-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2110477
OpenAlexW2330059739
LanguageEN
Citations received4

Specialization has long been viewed as an important decision-making strategy used by legislators. The purpose of this study is to evaluate a simple theory of specialization which is based on elementary decision-theory. The theory is expressed as an arithmetic representation and is evaluated by means of extensive sensitivity testing. It is found that the state party delegation appears to be a pervasive source of decision cues, and that specialization seems to be an important role expectation for members of the Democratic Study Group. Questions are also raised concerning the relation of specialization to influence, and a possible way of investigating legislator influence is discussed. SPECIALIZATION HAS LONG BEEN VIEWED as an important decisionmaking strategy used by legislators. The purpose of this study is to evaluate a simple theory of specialization which could make a contribution toward building a more comprehensive theory of legislative decision-making

Data mining · Decision rule · Decision theory · Delegation · Democracy · Economics · Epistemology · Legislator · Legislature · Management science · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Relation (database · Representation (politics · Simple (philosophy · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law

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