Able and Mostly Willing
An Empirical Anatomy of Information's Effect on Voter‐Driven Accountability in Senegal
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6231791 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Abhit Bhandari (0000-0003-3654-9751, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse), Horacio Larreguy (0000-0001-8491-6400, Harvard University, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Toulouse School of Economics), John Marshall (0000-0001-9576-1475, Columbia University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2023 |
| Volumen | 67 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 1040-1066 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2023-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12591 |
| OpenAlex | W3135418396 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 23 |
| Referencias citadas | 25 |
Political accountability may be constrained by the reach and relevance of information campaigns in developing democracies and—upon receiving information—voters' ability and will to hold politicians accountable. To illuminate voter‐level constraints and information relevance absent dissemination constraints, we conducted a field experiment around Senegal's 2017 parliamentary elections to examine the core theoretical steps linking receiving different types of incumbent performance information to electoral and nonelectoral accountability. Voters immediately processed information as Bayesians, found temporally benchmarked local performance outcomes particularly informative, and updated their beliefs for at least a month. Learning that incumbents generally performed better than expected, voters durably requested greater politician contact after elections while incumbent vote choice increased among likely voters and voters prioritizing local projects when appraising incumbents. In contrast, information about incumbent duties did not systematically influence beliefs or accountability. These findings suggest voters were able and mostly willing to use relevant information to hold politicians to account
Accountability · Contrast (vision · Core (optical fiber · Economics · Field (mathematics · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Relevance (law · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Social Media and Politics
I'd Be Surprisingly Good for You
Marshall Lecture 2025
Accountability in Developing Democracies
Voting age, information experiments, and political engagement
The political consequences of Africa's mobile revolution
Do voters use information on candidates? Experimental evidence from a recent election
Does performance information receive political attention
Can details depoliticize? An examination of the formalization strategy
Buying Informed Voters
Citizen response to local service provision
Rewarding performance in disaster response
Competence versus Priorities
Partisanship, attribution and approval in a public health shock
Targeting coethnic voters, elites, or both? Evidence from aid allocation in Malawi
Do Citizens Enforce Accountability for Public Goods Provision? Evidence from India’s Rural Roads Program
Closing the Gap
Owning It
Worst of the Bunch
Government Responsiveness in Developing Countries
The Effect of Sustained Transparency on Electoral Accountability
Mobile Internet and the Quality of Elections in Low-Income Democracies
Bureaucratic Quality and Electoral Accountability
Who Debates, Who Wins? At-Scale Experimental Evidence on the Supply of Policy Information in a Liberian Election
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion
Information, Accountability, and Cumulative Learning
Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians
How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign
Exposing Corrupt Politicians
Is Information Power? Using Mobile Phones and Free Newspapers during an Election in Mozambique
Does Information Lead to More Active Citizenship? Evidence from an Education Intervention in Rural Kenya
Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives
Buying Informed Voters
King Makers
Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification
Relative Economic Performance and the Incumbent Vote
Presidential Success and the World Economy
When Does Information Influence Voters? The Joint Importance of Salience and Coordination
A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting
Cognitive Heterogeneity and Economic Voting
Greater Expectations
Norms versus Action
Information Provision, Voter Coordination, and Electoral Accountability
Liaison legislature
I wld like u WMP to extend electricity 2 our village
Information Dissemination, Competitive Pressure, and Politician Performance between Elections
| Obras citantes distintas | 23 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 3,83 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 23 |