Sophisticated and Myopic Behavior in Legislative Committees
An Experimental Study
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231975 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Keith Krehbiel (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1986 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 542 |
| Publication date | 1986-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2111089 |
| OpenAlex | W2330217662 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 22 |
Legislative decision making is fundamentally sequential; subsets of members make decisions in committees prior to action by the full membership. But different theories of such two-stage decision making employ different assumptions about the degree of foresight committee members exercise. This paper summarizes the theories and reports on experiments that test whether committees acting in a larger legislature make decisions consistent with the hypotheses of sophisticated or myopic behavior. Under diverse conditionsincluding open and closed rules, and homogeneous and heterogeneous preferences-the predictions of committee-sophisticated behavior are superior to those of myopic behavior. The importance of committees in the legislative process is widely observed and rarely disputed, and formal theories have helped to clarify committee processes.' Traditionally, however, such theories pertain to committees that operate in isolation from the broader political system. Fiorina and Plott (1978) therefore qualified their study of what goes on within the 'black box' of committee decision-making by raising the question: [Ilf the committee decision is regarded by the members as only one stage in a sequence of games, might behavior in the committee reflect strategic considerations from the larger game? If so, a game might produce implications for the committee stage which differ substantially from those implied by models successful in explaining the processes of isolated committees (p. 593
Action (physics · Control (management · Economics · Futures studies · Law and economics · Legislature · Management · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Test (biology · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
The theory of political coalitions.
A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Elections with limited information
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
The positive theory of legislative institutions
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions
The Amendment in Legislative Strategy
An Experimental Study of the Effects of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior
Saving Amendments, Killer Amendments, and an Expected Utility Theory of Sophisticated Voting
Strategic Voting in Scandinavian Parliaments
Standing Committees in Legislatures
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Fairness in Majority Rule Games with a Core
A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
Bureaucratic Agenda Control
The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
Committee Decisions under Majority Rule
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 1986 - 2017 (32) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |