The Fortification Dilemma
Border Control and Rebel Violence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232068 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher W Blair (0000-0001-5774-5976, Princeton University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1366-1385 |
| Publication date | 2024-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12794 |
| OpenAlex | W4385424903 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 57 |
Where cross‐border sanctuaries enable rebels to marshal external support, classical theories of counterinsurgency extol the strategic value of border fortification. By sealing borders, counterinsurgents can erode transnational militants’ resources, degrading the quality of rebellion. Extending resource‐centric theories of conflict, I posit a fortification dilemma inherent in this strategy. Externally supplied rebels can afford conventional attacks and civilian victimization. When border fortifications interdict their foreign logistics, insurgents compensate by cultivating greater local support. In turn, rebels prefer more irregular attacks and cooperative relations with civilians. Hence, counterinsurgent border fortification trades off reduced rebel capabilities for greater competition over local hearts and minds. I test this theory using declassified microdata on border fortification and violence in Iraq. Results highlight the central link between border control and cross‐border militancy, and show how governments can contest the transnational dimensions of civil wars, such as external rebel sponsorship
Business · Competition (biology · CONTEST · Control (management · Development economics · Dilemma · Economics · Management · Political economy · Political science · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
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Rebels without Borders
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Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict
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Illusions of Victory
Border Walls and Smuggling Spillovers
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Hard Lessons
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Rebel Tactics
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Do Good Borders Make Good Rebels? Territorial Control and Civilian Casualties
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Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border Stability
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The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining
The Power to Resist
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Border Orientation in a Globalizing World
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Battle Losses and Rebel Violence
Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians
Social Isolation and Repertoires of Resistance
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International System and Technologies of Rebellion
Organizing Rebellion
Aid as a Tool against Insurgency
Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 9 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |