Executive Accountability Beyond Outcomes
Experimental Evidence on Public Evaluations of Powerful Prime Ministers
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232092 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marlis Becher (0000-0002-0570-3499, IE University), Michael Becher, Sylvain Brouard (0000-0002-5652-8715, Sciences Po ‐ CEVIPOF) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 106-122 |
| Publication date | 2022-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12558 |
| OpenAlex | W3083798598 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 17 |
| References cited | 39 |
Although executives in many democracies have constitutional powers to circumvent the majoritarian legislative process to make policy, political scientists know relatively little about whether and when ordinary people hold executives accountable for the process they use. To study this issue beyond the American presidency, we conduct a series of large survey experiments in France, where the institution of the confidence procedure puts the government in a strong position relative to parliament. Our experiments highlight that public evaluations of the executive reflect a fundamental trade‐off between policy and process. If they face significant opposition in the legislative process, executives either have to accept policy failure or risk punishment for the use of procedural force. People dislike both results, and the average popularity gain of using the confidence procedure over not delivering the policy is modest. Moreover, in some contexts, executives are strictly better off not legislating rather than applying force
Accountability · Economics · Law and economics · Legislative process · Legislature · Opposition (politics · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Popularity · Presidency · Public relations · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Public Administration
The Institutions of Programmatic Action
The effects of stress on political leadership evaluations
Democratic values and support for executive power
Sovereignty, Substance, and Public Support for European Courts’ Human Rights Rulings
Democratic backsliding and support for public good provision in the European Union
Differentiation, dominance and fairness in the European Union
How Violations of Electoral Integrity Undermine Partisan Attachments
Respect the Process
Partisan (A) Symmetries in Hardball
Countering Authoritarian Behavior in Democracies
Americans’ Attitudes Toward Federalism
The executive trump card
The Effect of International Actors on Public Support for Government Spending Decisions
Support for liberal democracy in times of crisis
The relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding
The Electoral Implications of Legislative Candidate Selection Democratization
Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States
Rationalizing Parliament
Power without Persuasion
The Economic Vote
Party Competition and Responsible Party Government
The Influence of Perceived Injustice on the Endorsement of Political Leaders 1
Identification, Inference and Sensitivity Analysis for Causal Mediation Effects
Validating vignette and conjoint survey experiments against real-world behavior
The Constitution of Equality
Analyzing Quota Sample Data and the Peer-review Process
Political Leadership and Representation in West European Democracies
Policy (Mis) Representation and the Cost of Ruling
Prime ministers and the electoral cost of using the confidence vote in legislative bargaining
Voter Reactions to Incumbent Opportunism
Unilateral Powers, Public Opinion, and the Presidency
Is Rule by Majorities Special
Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis
A New Political System Model
Who's the chef? Economic voting under a dual executive
Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes
Mobilizing the Public Against the President
Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual? The Factors Shaping Public Support for Unilateral Action
Responsibility Attribution for Collective Decision Makers
The Public Cost of Unilateral Action
Reconsidering the Role of Procedures for Decision Acceptance
Who Surfs, Who Manipulates? The Determinants of Opportunistic Election Timing and Electorally Motivated Economic Intervention
The economy, corruption, and the vote
Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy
Legislative Involvement in Parliamentary Systems
Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure
The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies
Candidate Positioning and Voter Choice
Does Public Opinion Constrain Presidential Unilateralism
Cabinet Decision Rules and Political Uncertainty in Parliamentary Bargaining
Process Preferences and American Politics
| Unique citing works | 17 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,83 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 17 |