Career Concerns and the Dynamics of Electoral Accountability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232500 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matias Iaryczower (0000-0003-4609-7189, Princeton University, corresponding author), Gabriel López‐moctezuma (California Institute of Technology), Adam Meirowitz (0000-0003-4671-8889, Yale University) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 696-713 |
| Publication date | 2024-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12740 |
| OpenAlex | W4308734111 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 36 |
Quantifying the value that legislators give to reelection relative to policy is crucial to understanding electoral accountability. We estimate the preferences for office and policy of members of the U.S. Senate, using a structural approach that exploits variation in polls, position‐taking, and advertising throughout the electoral cycle. We then combine these preference estimates with estimates of the electoral effectiveness of policy moderation and political advertising to quantify electoral accountability in competitive and uncompetitive elections. We find that senators differ markedly in the value they give to securing office relative to policy gains: While over a fourth of senators are highly ideological, a sizable number of senators are willing to make relatively large policy concessions to attain electoral gains. Nevertheless, electoral accountability is only moderate on average, due to the relatively low impact of changes in senators' policy stance on voter support
Accountability · Democracy · Economics · Electoral politics · Ideology · Microeconomics · Moderation · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Preference · Public economics · Value (mathematics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Social Psychology
Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting
The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators
Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House
Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting
The Politics of Ambiguity
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Grouped Patterns of Heterogeneity in Panel Data
Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects
Partisan Intoxication or Policy Voting
The control of politicians
Incumbent performance and electoral control
How prices matter in politics
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians
Constituents’ Responses to Congressional Roll‐Call Voting
Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections
Dominant Regimes and the Demise of Urban Democracy
Electoral Competition and Democratic Responsiveness
Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities
Parties and Electoral Performance in the Market for Political Consultants
Identifying the Persuasive Effects of Presidential Advertising
How Large and Long-lasting Are the Persuasive Effects of Televised Campaign Ads? Results from a Randomized Field Experiment
Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making
The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data
Out of Step, Out of Office
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |