The Analytical Foundations of Collective Action Theory
A Survey of Some Recent Developments
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6233097 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Luis Fernando Medina (0000-0002-9222-0806, Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Juan March Institute, Madrid 28006, Spain, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 259-283 |
| Publication date | 2013-05-11 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annual Review of Political Science (BOOK_SERIES) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1094-2939 • E-ISSN: 1545-1577 |
| Publisher | Annual Reviews (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1146/annurev-polisci-032311-110742 |
| OpenAlex | W2170640357 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 71 |
The theory of collective action has long since moved beyond the “free-rider problem” as originally stated by Olson (1965) . It is now recognized that large-scale participation is possible even without selective incentives, but this has raised new questions. I discuss two types of contributions from the past few years. Some of the recent literature has remained close to the canonical game-theoretic framework, clarifying many analytical issues and proving important results in participation games that had remained elusive. We now know that the “turnout paradox” had been grossly overstated. Another set of contributions has expanded the original framework, incorporating results from psychology and social sciences with the aim of obtaining more realistic models with better empirical performance
Action (physics · Collective action · Economics · Epistemology · Game theory · Incentive · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Set (abstract data type · Sociology · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
Retooling Politics
Ciência Política e análise de redes
How to integrate theories of norm emergence. The example of James S. Coleman’s and Robert C. Ellickson’s theories
Realist Review of Interventions Influencing Waste Management and Minimization Practices in New Zealand
Mangroves in Benin, West Africa
Taking Voice Seriously
The Costs of Collective Action
Repressed productive potential and revolt
Diasporic Foreign Policy Interest Groups in the United States
Using prediction market data for measuring the expected closeness in electoral research
What Motivates People to Vote? The Role of Selfishness, Duty, and Social Motives When Voting
Micromotives and macrobehavior
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games
A Unified Theory of Collective Action and Social Change
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion
Citizens, Politics and Social Communication
Contest success functions
On Players′ Models of Other Players
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
Who's Who in Networks. Wanted
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
A Theory of Participation in Elections
An economic theory of democracy
Rational Ritual
Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games
Beyond Individual Choice
The Logic of Collective Action
The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
A Logic of Expressive Choice
A strategic calculus of voting
A Theory of Focal Points
Now out of Never
Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network Games
The Dynamics of Informational Cascades
Altruism and Turnout
A Possible Solution to the Paradox of Voter Turnout
When Does Repression Work? Collective Action in Social Networks
Do Networks Solve Collective Action Problems? Credibility, Search, and Collaboration
Habitual Voting and Behavioral Turnout
Collective Action and the Mobilization of Institutions
Social Networks and Political Participation
Connecting the Congress
Is there really a turnout paradox
Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information
Reciprocity and Shared Knowledge Structures in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
The Role of Rivalry
Coordination and Shared Mental Models
Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action Heuristic
Groups in Rational Turnout Models
Social Networks and Collective Action
The Logic of Private and Collective Action
Voting May Be Habit‐Forming
Collective Action and Network Structure
Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice
Collective Action, Rival Incentives, and the Emergence of Antisocial Norms
The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study
Moral Bias in Large Elections
Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs
An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Models of Political Participation
Social Pressure and Voter Turnout
Rational Choice and the Dynamics of Collective Political Action
Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox
A Behavioral Model of Turnout
Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting
Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action
Social Networks and Political Participation
Complex Contagions and the Weakness of Long Ties
The Strength of Weak Ties
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,1 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |