The problem with counting preferences

The example of one nation party preferences at the 2001 Western Australian legislative assembly election

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6234087
AutoresNarelle Miragliotta (0000-0003-0235-2889, autor de correspondencia), Narelle L Miragliotta
Año2004
Volumen39
Número3
Páginas625-634
Fecha de publicación2004-11-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAustralian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1036-1146 • E-ISSN: 1363-030X
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/103614042000295183
OpenAlexW1986115548
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas9

A growing number of lower‐house seats at Australian State and federal elections rely on a distribution of preferences from Independent and small‐party candidates before seats can be awarded. Actors have attempted to gain political capital from this situation by claiming that the preferences of particular small parties have affected election outcomes. This paper uses the events of the Western Australian State election held in 2001 to explore the validity of such claims. More specifically, it investigates the widely propagated contention that the One Nation Party's anti‐sitting‐member preference strategy was a key determinant of the Coalition's electoral defeat. It concludes that the increased number of candidates contesting elections makes it difficult to assess whether the second and subsequent preferences of any particular small party were critical to the outcome

Distribution (mathematics · Economics · Federal election · General election · Legislature · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Preference · Primary election · State (computer science · Commonwealth, Australian Politics and Federalism · Computer Science · Labor Movements and Unions · Law · Public Administration