Multiple agents, blame games and public policy-making

The case of local government reform in New South Wales

Bibliographic Data

ID6234753
AuthorsJoseph Drew (0000-0003-3579-5758, Institute for Public Policy and Governance, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, Australia), Bligh Grant (0000-0002-8055-6046, University of Technology Sydney, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume52
Issue1
Pages37-52
Publication date2017-01-02
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1036-1146 • E-ISSN: 1363-030X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10361146.2016.1238872
OpenAlexW2560847307
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited20

Politicians often use 'independent experts' to avoid blame for contentious public policy. The use of multiple agents, however, has attracted relatively little attention. We extend the blame-avoidance literature to identify additional opportunities and risks that arise when multiple agents are used to support/oppose particular public policies. We then test our propositions using evidence from recent local government reforms in New South Wales. The picture which emerges is largely one of confusion whereby independent agents provide contradictory opinions, attempt to shift blame to one another, and dispute interpretations of earlier advice. We conclude our analysis with a discussion of the salient factors for successful pursuit of the multiple-agent variant of the blame games

Blame · Confusion · Economics · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Public policy · Public relations · Salient · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Policy Transfer and Learning · Psychology · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Social Psychology

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