What is the Best Strategy to Obtain Legislative Support
Survey Evidence from Brazilian State Assemblies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6235580 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Felipe Nunes (0000-0001-6944-4812, University of California System, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 88-113 |
| Publication date | 2012-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Brazilian Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1981-3821 • E-ISSN: 1981-3821 |
| Publisher | FapUNIFESP (SciELO) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1590/s1981-38212012000200004 |
| OpenAlex | W2080923659 |
| SCIELO_PID | S1981-38212012000200004 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 26 |
The legislative success of governments in Latin America has been explained by two main theories. For some authors, the main explanation involves the proactive and reactive powers of the chief executive. Other scholars argue that negotiations with deputies for portfolios and pork are the most important factors behind success in approving legislation. This paper proposes an innovative methodological strategy to test the mechanisms behind each of these theories. Original survey data of 12 Brazilian state-level assemblies is examined to assess elites' attitudes in regard to governors' strategies to obtain legislative support. Results suggest that there is not a unique equilibrium to the problem of coalition formation in multiparty settings. Deputies with concentrated constituencies, from more decentralized parties, and from conservative parties, tend to believe that the most efficient way a governor can obtain legislative support is to negotiate amendments with deputies. On the other hand, the more scattered a legislator's constituency and the more liberal or centralized his or her party, the more likely a deputy is to think that governors achieve better legislative success when they negotiate cabinet positions
Cabinet (room · Chamber of Deputies · Governor · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislator · Legislature · Negotiation · Political science · Sociology · State (computer science · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Engineering · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Politics and Society in Latin America · Public Administration
The Organization of Democratic Legislatures
The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil
Policy, Office, or Votes?
Why Parties?
The Theory of Democracy Revisited
Handbook of econometrics
Estimating Ideology of Brazilian Legislative Parties, 1990–2005
Minority government and majority rule
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
Ideology or What? Legislative Behavior in Multiparty Presidential Settings
The Executive Toolbox
The Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multiparty Presidential Democracies
The Cost of Governing
The Presidential Calculus
Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism
Modeling Electoral Coordination
Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas
The Inefficient Secret Revisited
Determinantes do comportamento particularista de legisladores estaduais brasileiros
O segredo ineficiente revisto
Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions
A democracia no Brasil
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,23 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2024 (12) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |