Blocs or Rounds? An Analysis of Two Approaches to Trade Liberalization
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6239719 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Heemin Kim (Florida State University), Dale L Smith (0000-0003-0854-9973, Florida State University) |
| Año | 1997 |
| Volumen | 30 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 427-449 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1997-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Canadian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0008-4239 • E-ISSN: 1744-9324 |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0008423900015961 |
| OpenAlex | W2076568368 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 37 |
This article examines the properties and relative strengths of two approaches to reducing barriers to trade among nations: multilateral negotiating rounds versus regional economic blocs. Instead of focusing on the net welfare gains—the macro-level effects—that result either from each member of the system reducing trade barriers to all its partners (rounds) or from reductions among a subset of states (blocs), the analysis focuses on the institutional features (group size and the voting and enforcement mechanisms) that may affect individual nations'micro-level motivations to participate in and abide by certain trade arrangements. Existing models in formal theory are used to analyze these approaches in terms of voting games and collective action models
Action (physics · Affect (linguistics · Collective action · Economics · Enforcement · Free trade · International economics · International trade · Macro · Market economy · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Public economics · Sociology · Voting · Welfare · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Game Theory and Applications · Global trade and economics
Cooperation and Governance in International Trade
Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners' dilemma
A dynamical model of political equilibrium
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Social Dilemmas
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
The Rise and Decline of Nations
Collective Action
Community, Anarchy, and Liberty
Community, Anarchy and Liberty
The Logic of Collective Action
The Possibility of Cooperation
The strongly stable core in weighted voting games
Law and its limitations in the Gatt multilateral trade system
The World Trading System
Restructuring the Gatt System
Western Hemisphere Economic Integration
The Political Economy of the World Trading System
The Compatibility of Regional Economic Blocs and the Gatt
New Dimensions in Regional Integration
Voting in International Economic Organizations
Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving
Regionalism and the Integration of the World Economy
Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the International Political Economy
Beneath the Commerce of Nations
Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action
The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games
The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
An Evolutionary Approach to Norms
Power Politics and International Trade
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |