On Using the Concept of Hypothetical Consent

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6242550
AutoresThomas J Lewis (McMaster University, autor correspondente)
Ano1989
Volume22
Fascículo4
Páginas793-808
Data de publicação1989-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoCanadian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0008-4239 • E-ISSN: 1744-9324
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0008423900020254
OpenAlexW2065478249
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas13

This article argues that the concept of hypothetical consent advanced by Hanna Pitkin has little force as a basis for political obligation. It reformulates the meaning of hypothetical consent by emphasizing the subjectivity of consent, and it points out how this subjective meaning expresses the right of actual citizens to dissent. It suggests how subjective hypothetical consent can be used from the perspective of a sovereign as a standard that requires the sovereign to treat citizens as if they had consented, although they have not consented. It concludes by arguing that although this standard may appear to corrode political authority, instead it enhances political authority. It drives the sovereign to relinquish the claim that citizens are obligated to obey, and to treat them so they will have reason to obey

Dissent · Epistemology · Law and economics · Meaning (existential · Obligation · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Politics · Popular sovereignty · Sociology · Sovereignty · Subjectivity · Computer Science · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Political Theology and Sovereignty · Psychology · Social Psychology