Transaction Costs and Host-Group Rivalry in Foreign Economic Policy
Evidence from Five North American Fisheries
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6243227 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brian Potter (Tulane University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 741-764 |
| Publication date | 2003-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Canadian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0008-4239 • E-ISSN: 1744-9324 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0008423903778846 |
| OpenAlex | W2015564434 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 8 |
This article shows that the timing and nature of policies hostile to foreign direct investment stem both from the transaction costs of negotiating with different host country agencies, and from changes to domestic and international coalitions. Divided agency jurisdiction is modeled as a partial property right to the use of a resource. Host industries lacking political cohesion allow foreign firms economic opportunities and a stronger political voice. Qualitative and quantitative evidence from five fisheries in the United States and Canada confirm that the costs of negotiating with a fractured government and the opportunity to form transnational coalitions lead host countries to adopt policies that will facilitate forced divestment. These policies vary in respect to their timing and format
Agency (philosophy · Business · Divestment · Economics · Foreign direct investment · Host (biology · International economics · International trade · Jurisdiction · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · Rivalry · Transaction cost · Finance · International Business and FDI · Marine and fisheries research · Natural Resources and Economic Development
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |