Formal Institutions After Conflict

Rebel Ideology and Post-War Constitutional Design

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6245571
AutoresSimón Ballestero (0009-0000-5429-0427, Chicago Center on Democracy, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA), Laia Bacell I Ventura (0000-0003-2922-4123, Georgetown University), Daniel Solomon (0000-0002-8436-9440, US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, USA)
Año2025
Fecha de publicación2025-09-03
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaComparative Political Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/00104140251369319
OpenAlexW4413949368
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas70

How do formal institutions emerge and change after a civil war? Complementing explanations focused on distributional conflict and the promotion of post-war peace and democracy, we argue that ideology plays a central role in shaping the most fundamental formal institution: the constitution. Using data from 153 civil wars between 1944–2016, we find that in the post-war period: (1) Victorious revolutionary socialist (RS) and secessionist rebels are more likely to promulgate new constitutions; (2) Victorious incumbents are more likely to adopt constitutional amendments; (3) Non-Maoist RS rebels enact constitutions with more symbolic content and rights compared to the incumbent or other victorious rebels. We illustrate the mechanisms behind these findings with a comparative analysis of multiple constitutional transitions in Cambodia. Our results underscore the importance of research on ideology and armed conflict as groups with ambitious goals for social transformation remain a powerful force for political change worldwide

Ideology · International conflict · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics · International Law and Human Rights · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Public Administration