Consequences of Military and Civilian Rule in Argentina

An Analysis of Central Government Budgetary Trade-Offs, 1961-1982

Bibliographic Data

ID6245668
AuthorsRobert E Looney (0000-0002-1252-1319), Peter C Frederiksen (Naval Postgraduate School)
Year1987
Volume20
Issue1
Pages34-46
Publication date1987-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueComparative Political Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0010414087020001002
OpenAlexW2109432953
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited10

This article examines whether budget allocations to nondefense programs in Argentina between 1961 and 1982 are dependent on the share to defense, the political regime, or both. Multiple regression equations are estimated and include the defense share, two control variables, and political dummies to test for changes in the intercept and slope of the equation as the regimes change. Regimes are differentiated between (a) the first civilian and first military (b) the Peronists, and (c) the second military

Control (management · Democracy · Economics · Management · Military rule · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Regime change · Regression analysis · Statistics · Test (biology · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Law · Mathematics · Political and Social Dynamics in Chile and Latin America · Political Conflict and Governance

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub