Mass Organization and the Durability of Competitive Authoritarian Regimes

Evidence From Venezuela

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6246751
AutoresSamuel Handlin (0000-0003-3459-2609, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA, autor de correspondencia)
Año2016
Volumen49
Número9
Páginas1238-1269
Fecha de publicación2016-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaComparative Political Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0010414016628186
OpenAlexW2309350981
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas39
Referencias citadas48

Many studies highlight the critical roles of political parties in enhancing autocratic durability, mainly emphasizing mechanisms related to elite cohesion. The role of a mass party organization in stabilizing autocracies, though well recognized, has received relatively less emphasis. This article argues that the import of mass organization on autocratic durability is likely to vary with autocratic regime type and be greatest in competitive authoritarian regimes. I then exploit unusual survey data and an original data set containing information on 18,037 regime-affiliated “Communal Councils” to examine the effects of a regime-affiliated mass organization on the incumbent vote in Venezuela. The formation of Communal Councils exerted a large effect on incumbent support but the strength of this effect varied depending on whether Councils were located in communities receiving high levels of material resources. These findings suggest that mass organization can greatly enhance competitive authoritarian durability but must be backed by patronage to be effective

Authoritarianism · Autocracy · Business · Cohesion (chemistry · Computer security · Democracy · Durability · Economic system · Economics · Elite · Exploit · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Society in Latin America