Judging Socialist Reform

The Politics of Coordinate Construction in France and Germany

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6246781
AutoresAlec Stone (University of California, Irvine, autor de correspondencia)
Año1994
Volumen26
Número4
Páginas443-469
Fecha de publicación1994-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaComparative Political Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0010414094026004003
OpenAlexW2040288358
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas20
Referencias citadas23

Case studies of judicial-political interaction during two periods, 1969-1976 in Germany and 1981-1985 in France, illustrate two general points about constitutional politics in both countries. First, constitutional courts are powerful policy makers whose impact on legislative processes and outcomes is multidimensional. These courts are more than simply negative legislators, empowered to veto legislative provisions. They also exercise creative legislative powers: to recast policy-making environments, to encourage certain legislative solutions while undermining others, and to have the precise terms of their decisions written directly into legislative provisions. Second, governments and parliamentarians are often led to behave judicially, to debate and make meaningful decisions about the constitutionality of legislation. In France and Germany, both the making of public policy and the construction of constitutional law are products of sustained and intimate judicial-political interaction

Constitution · Constitutionality · Economics · Judicial review · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Veto · Communism, Protests, Social Movements · European and International Law Studies · Law · Political and Social Issues · Public Administration