Subnational Turnover, Accountability Politics, and Electoral Authoritarian Survival

Evidence from Museveni's Uganda

Bibliographic Data

ID6247706
AuthorsSam Wilkins (0000-0002-7108-6265, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume54
Issue1
Pages149-173
Publication date2021-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueComparative Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0010-4159 • E-ISSN: 2151-6227
PublisherComparative Politics CUNY (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.5129/001041521x16060530242223
OpenAlexW4238713233
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited15

Most non-democratic regimes engineer elections such that regime change is effectively impossible via the ballot. However, many of these elections see high turnover of politicians at the subnational level, often through competitive processes that occur within ruling parties. This is the case for President Yoweri Museveni's dominant National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda, the ranks of which have been decimated by intra-party competition at each election throughout its three decades in power. This competition includes high levels of voter participation in mass primaries and general elections and is particularly acute in the rural southern areas where Museveni's simultaneous presidential candidacy draws most support. Based on qualitative data from the 2016 elections, this article investigates the relationship between this local, intra-party competition and Museveni's survival, building a theory that local competition in electoral authoritarian regimes can provide an outlet for accountability politics by redirecting widespread voter frustrations away from a regime and towards expendable local politicians

Accountability · Authoritarianism · Ballot · Biology · Candidacy · Competition (biology · Democracy · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Turnout · Voting · Cambodian History and Society · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Public Administration

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