Germany's silence

We can currently see the formation of new nationalist and racist parties or tendencies within established parties to lean towards right-wing politics within many European countries; from the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands, Lega Nord or Lega in Italia, Vox in Spain, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Front National in France, the Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden, Fidesz in Hungary, and Golden Dawn in Greece, to name only a few. At the same time, there has been a surge in racist, fascist, and antisemitic attacks within Europe. Since 1991, Neo-Nazi gangs have attacked migrants and members of antifascist groups, burned down housing facilities for asylum seekers (including facilities for Ukrainian refugees in 2022), disrupted social initiatives, and spread fear (BfV, 2022; cf. Speit, 2021). However, most of these activities were described as the criminal action of socially marginalized individuals, downplaying the organized structure behind these far-right activities and, thus, paving the way for more attacks.1 Part of this paper is to show how the epistemic tools developed by the epistemology of ignorance literature can help to understand (a) why the organized structures of far-right movements are unintelligible within the dominant frame of intelligibility in Europe and (b) how the silence about far-right movements shifts the boundaries for what can be said or done, thus, having deeply problematic repercussions for who can feel safe in Europe. This paper has a modest aim: By bringing into focus contexts of social injustice that have not received much attention in the current literature and by understanding them with the help of existing research from the debate on problematic epistemic practices and philosophy of language, the paper aims to highlight some problematic practices.2 In this paper, I want to concentrate on a series of attacks carried out in Germany. From 2000 to 2007, the National Socialist Underground (NSU) succeeded in murdering 10 people, one police officer, and nine migrants in Germany. The victims are Enver Şimşek, Abdurrahim Özüdoğru, Süleyman Taşköprü, Habil Kılıç, Mehmet Turgut, İsmail Yaşar, Theodoros Boulgarides, Mehmet Kubaşık, Halit Yozgat, and Michèle Kiesewetter. NSU also attempted to murder another 43 times, committed three bomb attacks in Nuremberg and Cologne, as well as 15 robberies. In addition to the three known members of the organization—Beate Zschäpe, Uwe Mundlos, and Uwe Böhnhardt—it remains an open question how many others were involved. However, it can be assumed that they had good connections with at least another 100–200 persons; including confidential informants, members of the German intelligence service and police force, and officials of extreme right-wing parties.3 Yet, instead of investigating even the possibility of a Neo-Nazi terrorist organization as relatives of the victims and migrant communities demanded,4 the German police tried to pin all of the murders and attacks on individuals from migrant communities; more often than not on the relatives of the deceased without any substantial evidence. Only in 2011, when two of the three members of NSU were found dead and the third surrendered to the police, investigations turned their focus onto the NSU. Yet, even then, the investigation of NSU and the trial of its members are overshadowed by a hesitation to thoroughly understand the complexities of Neo-Nazi organization and crimes; in its most extreme form, witnesses were found dead, others lied, documents disappeared, and officials of the intelligence service withheld important information without facing any repercussions (Förster, 2017; cf. Kohl, 2011; NSU Watch, n.d.).5 On July 11, 2018, the trial of the NSU concluded in Munich, Germany. The trial took place between May 2013 and July 2018 at the Higher Regional Court in Munich. It was one of the longest and largest trials in German history and gained public interest because of claims of institutionalized racism within the German police force and German intelligence service. In fact, it took another 2 years for the court to provide a written verdict that is not open to the public despite the fact that this trial is of major public importance.6 Five individuals were at trial: Beate Zschäpe, André Eminger, Holger Gerlach, Carsten Schultze, and NPD-member Ralf Wohlleben. Zschäpe was found guilty of murder in 2018 and sentenced to life imprisonment, Wohlleben was sentenced to 10 years in prison, Gerlach and Schulze to 3 years in prison, and Eminger to two and a half years. They were charged inter alia on account of 10 murders, serious arson, being members of a terrorist organization, aiding and abetting a terrorist organization, and being accessories for the NSU. Yet, 13 not 10 persons lost their lives in right-wing terrorist attacks that can reasonably be attributed to the NSU. Furthermore, the court focused on merely those five individuals, failing to establish links to other individuals and extreme-right groups and to the German police and intelligence service; partly because of destroyed evidence and partly because the police investigation simply ignored available evidence, including the testimonies of several individuals. It is thus not surprising that the trial faced some major criticism. I cannot understand, why you didn't address our questions. Why you didn't have enough respect for us to explain why these questions had no place in your court and your verdict? [...] The written verdict is very long. But why have you not at least written down, what you asked us, what you heard from all the witnesses—from us and others—what these murders did with us and our families? Why have you not written down, what transpired about the many helpers of the group, what came forth about who knew about these three people, how close the state was to them? Why have you not written down that the whole truth cannot be found when documents are destroyed and witnesses lie. [...] We didn't want the impossible. We wanted that you listen to us, who knew before everyone else that Nazis were behind the murders. We wanted that you did your duty. That you would investigate what happened. That you would write down what was said.7 (my emphasis) In this paper, I aim to shed light on these claims and Elif Kubaşık's questions. To do so, I use epistemic tools such as the epistemology of ignorance and Fricker's theory of testimonial injustice. In fact, Elif Kubaşık's words sound familiar to anyone who has read Fricker's analysis of the Tom Robinson case in Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird. Here, Fricker shows the way in which a desperate Atticus Finch asks the jurors to do their duty and not be determined in their verdict by the deeply problematic prejudice that it is in Tom Robinson's nature qua being a Black man to lie. Finch says: "...In the name of God, do your duty." (1960, p. 210) in the same way that Elif Kubaşık says "We wanted that you did your duty." In the following, I focus on the police investigation as a case of testimonial injustice; arguing that the investigating officers did not adequately listen and use the testimony of relatives of the deceased due to pernicious stereotypes and that they failed to adequately acknowledge the danger of existent Neo-Nazi terror due to the persistent framework according to which Germany does not have an organized far-right structure. However, in comparison to the case of Tom Robinson, the identity stereotypes at work are best described as intersectional; they pertain to (at least) racist, religious, and class stereotypes.8 I then focus on the frame of intelligibility that masks the systemic problem of Neo-Nazis within German institutions, parties, and everyday life. I do so by showing that the trial and its judges failed to address the aforementioned investigative shortcomings and the questions of the relatives in their concluding statement and that no incentives were given to further investigate the relations between NSU and officials both in the German police force and intelligence service due to a problematic frame of intelligibility, that is closely related to the notion of white ignorance as introduced by Charles Mills. Finally, I argue that the shortcomings in the investigation and the trial contribute to a racist climate in so far as they change the framework of what can be said and done; with deeply problematic repercussions in so far as the relatives of the deceased as well as many other migrants were robbed of feeling safe in the country they made their home and other Neo-Nazis were confirmed in their hate, which provoked further killings such as the murder of Walter Lübcke as well as the murders in Halle and Hanau (cf. Speit, 2021). My aim is to show how testimonial injustice itself creates a dominant but harmful narrative and, thus, to suggest a middle ground between Fricker's theory of testimonial injustice and the literature on the epistemology of ignorance. In this way, structural testimonial injustice contributes to what can be said and done in a society and what cannot. I conclude with some thoughts on the role of political philosophers and theorists when faced with such troubling cases. Here, I want to draw attention to a gap within political and social philosophy: The NSU and other Neo-Nazi networks and tendencies remain mostly ignored; in fact, very few philosophical papers can be found on the NSU or similar racist and antisemitic groups or structures.9 '... In the name of God, do your duty.' Atticus's voice had dropped, and as he turned away from the jury he said something I [his daughter] did not catch. He said it more to himself than to the court. I punched Jem [her brother]. 'What'd he say?' '"In the name of God, believe him," I think that's what he said.' Atticus Finch is not asking the jury members to focus "on their moral and legal duty to convict only if they truly judge the defendant guilty" (Fricker, 2007, p. 25), because he knows that their prejudices would override this. Instead, he asks them to simply believe Tom Robinson, to give him credibility. Yet, despite the given evidence, "their immovably prejudiced social perception of Robinson as a speaker leads at once to a gross epistemic failure and an appalling ethical failure of grave practical consequence" (Fricker, 2007, p. 26). The trial of Tom Robinson is a case of structural testimonial injustice that is produced not by a single instance of prejudicial credibility deficit but by the kind where the prejudice tracks "the subject through different dimensions of social activity—economic, educational, professional, sexual, legal, political, religious, and so on" (Fricker, 2007, p. 27). Hence, it is not a one-time occurrence from which the subject can recover in another context but part of a whole set of social injustices. Structural testimonial injustice is grounded in a pernicious prejudice related to a person's (assumed) social identity. Tom Robinson suffers from racist identity prejudice in more than just one context: "[Tom Robinson] lives in a society in which the prejudice that devalues his word also blocks his everyday pursuits repeatedly and in every social direction" (Fricker, 2007, p. 29). Hence, Fricker follows, structural testimonial injustice is identity-prejudicial credibility deficit. This kind of testimonial injustice is, I will argue, also at play in the police investigation and the NSU trial that is the topic of this paper; the relatives of the deceased were subject to identity-prejudicial credibility deficit in the police investigation. To make my argument, I will proceed as follows: First, focusing on Elif Kubaşık and her daughter Gamze Kubaşık, I give some background information about their testimony and how it failed to gain access to the police investigation. Second, I show how this is a case of credibility deficit and, third, that this deficit is due to racial identity prejudice and, thus, ethically and epistemically problematic. Third, I relate the case to Gaile Pohlhaus's theory of willful hermeneutical ignorance to shift the focus away from the suffering of Elif Kubaşık and Gamze Kubaşık and towards problematic yet dominant frames of intelligibility and, thus, to the responsibility that the police investigators and the judges of the trial had in this case. Not "doing their duty resulted in a failure to set these injustices right and helped in creating a climate in which racist sentiments and acts are thriving." On November 5, 2013, Elif Kubaşık and Gamze Kubaşık, wife and daughter of the murdered Mehmet Kubaşık, testified in the NSU trial.10 While this testimony is different to the testimony of Tom Robinson because neither Elif nor Gamze Kubaşık are accused of anything, it shows some troubling parallels in the ways in which neither one is given adequate credibility. Part of my argument that Elif and Gamze Kubaşık are suffering from testimonial injustice is to show—through their testimony—that the investigating police officers failed to give them credibility, another part is to show the dismissal both of Mehmet Kubaşık's description of character as well as Elif and Gamze Kubaşık's suffering due to the murder of their husband and father. We will see that the lack of credibility, in this case, points to a straightforward case of testimonial injustice; yet, the dismissal of Elif and Gamze Kubaşık's well-being as well as the ignorance towards Neo-Nazis organization results from a problematic frame of intelligibility at play in Germany. Consider the following as an illustration of how the investigating police officers failed to treat Elif or Gamze Kubaşık as credible knowers and reliable sources of information that might help with the investigation and with the respect they deserve as family members of a deceased person: Both Elif and Gamze Kubaşık were called to testify the day after Mehmet Kubaşık was shot. Both she and her mother had not been able to sleep in the night after the murder, in the morning they were picked up by the police—visibly for all neighbors—and immediately separated at the station. Gamze Kubaşık was being brought into a room, in which two police officers were waiting; at no point was she asked if she was ok and capable of following the police questioning; otherwise, she would have told them to postpone the questioning feeling both too emotionally strained and scared. She was also not informed that she could have legal support when being questioned. Instead, she was asked whether her father had any enemies or an affair; a question she thought was highly inappropriate the day after he was shot. She was then shown photos of nine to ten foreign-looking men, but she did not know any one of them. One of the officers asked her to look at the photos again, and she explained again that she had not seen these men before. Then the officer turned to his partner and remarked that she failed to even realize that two of the photos showed the same men. Both of them laughed and made fun of her. Let me repeat this: The day after her father was shot, Gamze Kubaşık was brought in for questioning—without any evidence that she herself is under investigation—and the police officers not only fail to show a little bit of sympathy with her plight but instead made fun of her. Furthermore, both Elif and Gamze Kubaşık are asked to testify to the character of Mehmet Kubaşık during the trial. Elif Kubaşık describes him as a caring husband and father, a likable character both within and outside the family, and she testifies about the good life they had as a family before Mehmet Kubaşık was murdered. Gamze Kubaşık testifies that her father was a good man, who was liked by everyone; when they went for walks together outside, people would stop and enjoy talking to him and teenagers were drawn to his jokes and likable character. Furthermore, both—Elif and Gamze Kubaşık—testify about the problems the family had to cope with after the attack. Elif Kubaşık explains how her son was beaten up on the street due to the rumors spread about the father selling drugs after the police raided their apartment and shop with dogs and questioned the neighbors about the families' drug business and/or use. She continues to explain that the older son refused to go outside because everyone would point fingers at him after the attack. The older son as well as the younger one lost a year in school due to the insensitive police investigation in the aftermath of their father's murder. Finally, Gamze Kubaşık speaks about her own and her mother's state of anxiety; for example, she was unable to start her vocational training because she was scared to take the train to work thinking the murderers of her father came back. For a year, she was unable to leave the house. Her mother also had panic attacks. Both the suffering of the family during the investigation as well as in the aftermath are direct results from (a) a one-sided and insensitive police investigation, in which all of the family members are treated not as victims but as criminals and (b) a failure of the police and the legal institutions within Germany to convincingly show that racist and fascist attacks against citizens are Gamze Kubaşık is scared when she is In fact, Elif or Gamze Kubaşık received no from the investigating police officers nor the judge for the problematic ways in which the investigation was and for a on the whole and of these shortcomings are in the written Finally, both Elif and Gamze Kubaşık testify further that they the that Mehmet Kubaşık was murdered by Nazis on during the investigation. Elif Kubaşık explains that she was asked by a in about who might have her to which she that she is that her husband was by Neo-Nazis due to the fact that all murdered of them and one by that She testifies that this was not the only that she this but no one her. Gamze Kubaşık explains that she the that her father was murdered by Neo-Nazis to and of the police the but he said that they had this of In fact, the police investigation at no point made a between Neo-Nazis and the the NSU part of the investigation only after two of their members were found dead on November 2011, together with their of to these and further attacks. This is despite the fact that the police from the Neo-Nazi in which the NSU was It also be that even after the between NSU and the murders officers of for the of the destroyed on this which is why the testimony of family members are of for this trial. Yet, Elif and Gamze Kubaşık's and further testimony received no they were not given the credibility they my is that many of the relatives of the deceased from testimonial injustice during the police investigation. However, it is that they a credibility deficit from the for this to be a case of testimonial it has to be shown that the credibility deficit is due to prejudicial stereotypes about their social in this case The way in which the police investigation turned against Mehmet Kubaşık and the family of some prejudicial Not only did the police fail to take Elif and Gamze Kubaşık they an investigation into the testimony from the family and others that the had to do with criminal The investigation into the any evidence this Elif Kubaşık testifies that she was asked why her husband was three or why he had an to a with that were explained for a but Elif Kubaşık was told that these are highly these and the police of the apartment for drugs showed no evidence that Mehmet Kubaşık had been a drug the police investigation turned towards the that the have been due to activities in which Mehmet Kubaşık was or a family Elif Kubaşık testifies that she was asked what would if there is a family the Gamze Kubaşık further testifies that she was asked on several by the police whether her father was an organized of the or The that the police investigation between Mehmet Kubaşık and the or is in with prejudice against and the being that all and migrants in and have connections to criminal In comparison to Fricker's analysis of Black racist identity prejudices in the case of Tom Robinson, can see an racism that both on racist and racism describes a of racism that and people who are assumed to be it is whether those the show that racism is in Germany. In 2018 and in of the German with the statement that not be to to Germany. Furthermore, in the same that they are scared of of racism within the German police force found that police officers have a of the that are to criminals than the Furthermore, these prejudices are with class prejudices according to which social are to be or While stereotypes in Germany are different to stereotypes in the there are for example, the problematic that both social groups are more criminal than other groups (cf. or that both groups are social and thus, for problems of the state (cf. these into it is a that the police attacked (at least on prejudicial stereotypes in their investigation of the NSU murders. This can be by the investigation into criminal or and, by such as the one about the family the the police officer the racist of migrant communities being organized in in comparison to the white can conclude that part of the of why the police failed to Elif and Gamze Kubaşık as knowers and in ways to their is that they from a credibility deficit due to racist prejudicial In other they from testimonial injustice as by Fricker with to the injustice of Tom Robinson's and this is despite the fact that the racism out It is important to that not all of credibility deficit are by in fact, according to the deficit results from (Fricker, 2007, p. is if it both ethically and epistemically p. and in the fact that is far from Hence, even and will make a about the credibility they a might want to argue that the investigative and towards Elif and Gamze Kubaşık during the investigation were the many more people who and during the investigation, is not the word that to However, have seen that when a credibility deficit is by identity then it is both ethically and epistemically From the of the testimony as well as the racist made by the police during the investigation as well as the of investigation into the family it is to conclude that Elif and Gamze Kubaşık from an ethically and epistemically identity-prejudicial credibility deficit and not merely from an on part of the investigating officers and the one might want to to my argument by questioning that Elif and Gamze Tom from testimonial injustice as by In fact, has brought a argument for why Fricker the Robinson trial. to that knowers are both and to a different of the moral in the case of Tom Robinson To that are is in to and the being that it is not the case that any is on our social and our can to see the in different this does not that one of us has different nor that some to more or than for example, and have our social provide a context from which and the In other it is due to the that are to our social that of and p. which what are what look and where our to this can work as an to epistemically by Charles will in be unable to understand the they have p. Yet, the can also be such that if are and, thus, to others are not merely with our own and but also know what those in from us and what that is, have to look at the from our own as well as This is well known from notion of Furthermore, being in a and marginalized often that "the epistemic by most knowers in society for the will be to those in which knowers p. This to a with can the epistemic in such a way that they their social but have a understanding of the to the fact that they have to understand merely their own with or without can have a understanding of the as described but lack the to the epistemic Hence, being in a marginalized that between our social and the existing dominant epistemic that can help us understand these something Fricker attention to when she the notion of an that the epistemic tools and with which to know what know it is not up to us as individuals what kind of tools and can be by epistemic are on they to our p. in at the same time, what is through the available epistemic epistemic are those that can make our in adequate and fail to do change our existing or new However, in an society in which some have others are not all In fact, can see that and right for the well will be determined by what is in the and what is in the itself will what do to know to and p. in This that the marginalized is more to the existing and dominant epistemic to be an in their than more This them in a in which they the ways in which to and it is to their to more and adequate that make their this is not the case for more Hence, being

Aesthetics · Art · Criminology · Ignorance · Injustice · Political science · Politics · Refugee · Silence · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Gender Studies · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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