The Non‐instrumental Value of Democracy

The Freedom Argument

Bibliographic Data

ID6249677
AuthorsChristian F Rostbøll (0000-0002-9887-0092, Department of Social Sciences, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume22
Issue2
Pages267-278
Publication date2015-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueConstellations (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1351-0487 • E-ISSN: 1467-8675
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1467-8675.12159
OpenAlexW1508360589
LanguageEN
Citations received12

A current debate in democratic theory concerns whether we can explain democratic legitimacy purely with reference to the intrinsic value of the public affirmation of equality, or whether we must invoke extra-democratic epistemic standards to do so. The freedom side of democracy is ignored or even rejected in this debate. But in order to understand the intrinsic value of democracy, we cannot ignore the relationship between freedom and democracy. Moreover, the freedom argument can better respond to the epistemic challenge to intrinsic accounts than can the equality argument. However, the freedom argument for democracy must be refined to avoid important objections to the idea that democracy can make citizens self-governing. The proposed freedom argument is based on notions of autonomy and freedom that have their root in the relational norm of not having another person as a master

Argument (complex analysis · Democracy · Econometrics · Economics · Instrumental variable · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Sociology · Statistics · Value (mathematics · Law · Mathematics · Medicine · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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