Monetary malpractice
Intent, impotence, or incompetence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6251864 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James M Buchanan (George Mason University), David I Fand (George Mason University) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 457-469 |
| Publication date | 1992-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Critical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0891-3811 • E-ISSN: 1933-8007 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/08913819208443275 |
| OpenAlex | W1996715925 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 2 |
Monetary policy prior to, during, and following the 1990–1991 recession was the tightest and most restrictive in over 30 years. Some have suggested that this policy was explicitly designed by the monetary hawks on the Federal Reserve to wring out the residues of inflationary expectations; others, that the central bank could not offset the real, and powerful, negative shocks buffeting the American economy. But a better explanation is that the monetary authorities were passive because they failed to appreciate the treacherous financial weather caused by new capital requirements and the massive bailout of insolvent institutions
Bailout · Capital (architecture · Economics · Financial crisis · Insolvency · Keynesian economics · Macroprudential regulation · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Recession · Systemic risk · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Economic, financial, and policy analysis · Insurance and Financial Risk Management · Finance
| Citations per year | 0.04 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1999 - 1999 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |