Re-Engaging Normative and Empirical Democratic Theory

Or, Why Normative Democratic Theory Is Empirical All the Way Down

Bibliographic Data

ID6252452
AuthorsQuinlan Bowman (0000-0003-2592-8449, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume34
Issue2
Pages159-201
Publication date2022-04-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCritical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0891-3811 • E-ISSN: 1933-8007
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/08913811.2022.2054612
OpenAlexW4281564777
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited52

Historically, many philosophers and social scientists have sharply distinguished between "normative" and "empirical" forms of inquiry. In response, some have called for a re-engagement of these forms of inquiry. Here I offer a novel way of justifying such re-engagement in democratic theory. Drawing on classical pragmatism, I argue that normative democratic theory is a form of practical reasoning, hence inevitably involves empirical inquiry. Thus, in reasoning about what democratic processes ought to look like, we should avoid sharply distinguishing normative from empirical forms of reasoning, just as we should avoid sharply distinguishing theoretical from practical forms of reasoning

Democracy · Democratic Theory · Economics · Empirical evidence · Empirical research · Epistemology · Normative · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Pragmatism · Sociology · Critical Realism in Sociology · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education

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