Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Democracy and state bias in Latin America

Some lessons from Mexico, Peru and Venezuela

Bibliographic Data

ID6254665
AuthorsGeorge Philip (0000-0002-2226-0490)
Year1999
Volume6
Issue4
Pages74-92
Publication date1999-12-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueDemocratization (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1351-0347 • E-ISSN: 1743-890X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13510349908403633
OpenAlexW2022351339
LanguageEN
References cited22

This discussion considers why democracy has not so far led to the creation of impartial, honest and effective state institutions in Mexico, Venezuela and Peru. The explanation offered is essentially historical‐institutional. Non‐impartial (that is, biased) types of governance have a tendency to reproduce themselves over time due to the advantages that they offer to the powerful. However this observation, while true, does not explain why democracy has not done more to bring about the rule of law. The research focuses on Mexico, Peru and Venezuela because these are all cases in which democracy has failed spectacularly to discipline political competition within a framework of law. The Mexico's ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party maintains significant popular support despite conclusive evidence of previous ballot rigging, and continuing evidence of large‐scale corruption. Peru's Fujimori was re‐elected as president in 1995 despite previously using force to close the national Congress. Venezuela's Chavez convincingly won presidential elections in 1998, only six years after leading a coup attempt against an elected government

Ballot · Corporate governance · Democracy · Economics · Government (linguistics · Language change · Latin Americans · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Rule of law · Sociology · State (computer science · Voting · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Society in Latin America · Public Administration

  • Institutional Theory in Political Science

    B Guy Peters•Institutional Theory in Political…•2012

  • World Development Report 1997

    World Bank•The state in a changing world.•1997

  • Strong Parties and Lame Ducks

    Michael Coppedge•Strong Parties and Lame Ducks•1994

  • Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance

    Open Access•Douglass C North•Institutions, Institutional…•1990

  • Political Corruption in Europe and Latin America

    Open Access•Walter E Little, Walter Little et al.•Political Corruption in Europe…•1996

  • The Paradox of Plenty

    Terry Lynn Karl•Paradox of Plenty•1997

  • Low intensity democracy

    Barry K Gills, Barry Gills et al.•Third World Quarterly•1992

  • Taking on Goliath

    Open Access•Deborah L Norden•Political Science Quarterly•1998

  • Lessons of the Venezuelan experience

    James Ferguson•International Affairs•1995

  • Latin America

    Open Access•Moisés Naím•Journal of democracy•1994

  • Venezuelan Democracy and the Coup Attempt of February 1992

    Open Access•George Philip•Government and Opposition•1992

  • Civil society, the market and democracy in Latin America

    Jenny Pearce•Democratization•1997

  • The lawless presidency

    George Philip•Democratization•1998

  • Economic Reforms and Democracy

    Open Access•Jordan Gans-Morse, Simeon Nichter•Comparative Political Studies•2008

  • Neopopulism and neoliberalism in Latin America

    Open Access•K Weyland•Studies in Comparative…•1996

  • Liberalism and Democracy

    Marc F Plattner•Foreign Affairs•1998

  • The Rise of Illiberal Democracy

    Fareed Zakaria•Foreign Affairs•1997

Highly citedNo

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae