Committee bias in legislatures with a high degree of party cohesion
Evidence from Danish municipalities
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6258129 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Martin Baekgaard (0000-0001-6683-396X, Aarhus University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 315-335 |
| Publication date | 2011-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Political Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0304-4130 • E-ISSN: 1475-6765 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01927.x |
| OpenAlex | W2104479871 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 30 |
The institution of committees in democratic legislatures has for years been said to bias policy making because the preferences of committee members differ from, and are more alike than, those of other legislators due to self-selection to the committees. Based on an analysis of United States Senate committees, Hall and Grofman suggested in 1990 that the preferences of committee members primarily diverge from, and are more alike than, those of non-committee members on policy issues that are salient to constituencies or at least to an easily definable segment of constituencies. This article argues that the logic of Hall and Grofman should in fact be reversed in legislatures characterised by highly cohesive parties. Accordingly, the main hypothesis is that in such legislatures the preferences of committee members are more likely to be alike than those of non-committee members in the committees that work with policy issues of less salience to constituencies. Using a large-scale comparative design comprising data collected in 2008 on the spending preferences of 1,348 Danish local politicians, evidence is found supporting this hypothesis. This finding points to the importance of considering the role of parties when assessing committee bias
Cohesion (chemistry · Danish · Legislature · Political science · Salience (neuroscience · Select committee · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Psychology · Public Administration
How is Political Influence Redistributed in Times of Fiscal Austerity
Negative feedback, political attention, and public policy
Within‐party Allocation of Committee Seats
Why Are Some Policy Agendas Larger than Others
Shaping Political Preferences
Political Consensus and Fiscal Outcomes
Self‐selection or Socialization? A Dynamic Analysis of Committee Member Preferences
The Bureaucracy and the Policy Agenda
Performance Information, Blame Avoidance, and Politicians' Attitudes to Spending and Reform
When Politics Matters
Walking the line
Competing Principals
Partisan theory after fifteen years
When parties matter
The relationship between politicians and administrators – a logic of disharmony
Newspapers and Budgeting
Committee Governance and Socialization in the European Union
The Organizing of the European Parliament
Shaping Local Councillor Preferences
The Effects of Measurement and Methods Decisions on Committee Preference Outlier Results
Self-Selection Reconsidered
Jurisdiction, Institutional Structure, and Committee Representativeness
Committee Outliers in State Legislatures
Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions
The demand for local government goods
Committee structure and political preferences
Do parties matter for local revenue policies? A comparison of Denmark and Norway
Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition
The Public as Thermostat
Partisanship, Consensus, and Committee-Floor Divergence
Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies
The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias
Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers
Bargaining in Legislatures
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
Why Government Spending Grows
Distributive and Partisan Issues in Agriculture Policy in the 104th House
Endogenous Preferences and the Study of Institutions
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,69 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2023 (14) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |