Why change party finance transparency? Political competition and evidence from the ‘deviant’ case of Norway

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6258578
AutoresValeria Tonhäuser (0000-0002-3415-4062, Cologne Center for Comparative Politics University of Cologne and Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf Germany, autor correspondente), Torill Stavenes (0000-0002-4276-4362, Department of Politics University of Exeter UK)
Ano2020
Volume59
Fascículo3
Páginas578-598
Data de publicação2020-08-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEuropean Journal of Political Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0304-4130 • E-ISSN: 1475-6765
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1475-6765.12369
OpenAlexW2981782087
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas6
Referências citadas43

This article focuses on the development of a key type of regulation ensuring public surveillance of political finance: party finance transparency rules. It makes two contributions to the emerging theory on the evolution of political finance regulation. First, using previous research, it conceptualises the underlying causal mechanisms that explain when and why party finance transparency regulation changes. Second, it presents the first detailed study of party finance transparency reforms in Norway, which is a deviant case for the introduction of such reforms. It is found that, in the absence of major scandals, an intense political discourse on corruption and political competition are sufficient factors to launch transparency reforms. Whether reforms are enacted depends on the interaction of several factors. Parties that predominantly rely on state funding and grassroots support push for and adopt more constraining transparency regulation, while parties that are close to business oppose it. Experience of regulation in similar contexts and intense discourse on corruption – stimulated by domestic or international events – are necessary for the reform to succeed. Norwegian cooperation with the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) further demonstrates that the success of party finance transparency reforms initiated by a foreign actor is a function of the existing tradition of party regulation, the policy position of a governing party and the international reputational costs of non‐compliance

Campaign finance · Competition (biology · Economics · Grassroots · Language change · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Transparency (behavior · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Finance