International oversight of fiscal discipline
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6258706 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Fabio Franchino (0000-0001-8774-6494, Professor of Political Science, Department of Social and Political Studies Università degli Studi di Milano Milan Italy, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 281-302 |
| Publication date | 2024-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Political Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0304-4130 • E-ISSN: 1475-6765 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1475-6765.12600 |
| OpenAlex | W4378228968 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 45 |
Fiscal discipline, the sustainable balancing of government outlays with revenues, is one of the most extensively theorized and empirically investigated objects of inquiry in political economy. Yet, studies covering European Union (EU) countries have mostly ignored the oversight of national budgets via the EU excessive deficit procedure. I explain why this surveillance engenders lower deficits and investigate its effects across all EU member countries. Results indicate that the impact of surveillance during budget drafting offsets that of a two‐year shortening of expected government duration, the addition of one party to a government coalition when debt is high, or a leftward shift in government ideology when the risk of replacement is low. Moreover, estimates from exact matching on treatment histories indicate that these effects peak after four to five years. These findings have important normative implications for democratic policy‐making in European countries and the fledgling EU‐wide fiscal policy
Debt · Deficit spending · Democracy · democratic deficit · Economic policy · Economics · European union · Fiscal policy · Government (linguistics · Government revenue · Ideology · Macroeconomics · Matching (statistics · Normative · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Revenue · Credit Risk and Financial Regulations · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Finance
Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies
Ruling Europe
Fiscal Governance in Europe
Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline
Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit
Fragmented fiscal policy
Semi-Presidentialism
A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies
Fiscal discipline in EMU? Testing the effectiveness of the Excessive Deficit Procedure
Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies
Patterns of Regional Authority
Budget Deficits and Coalition Governments
Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy
Political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy in the European Community
Do budgetary institutions mitigate the common pool problem? New empirical evidence for the EU
Fiscal Governance in the Eurozone
Paths to Compliance
Are there Political Budget Cycles in the Euro Area
Multiparty Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Public Spending
A Copula Approach to the Problem of Selection Bias in Models of Government Survival
Politicisation and economic governance design
The Political Stability and Growth Pact is Dead
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation
Cabinet structure and fiscal policy outcomes
Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes
Institutional Constraints on Profligate Politicians
Effective” Number of Parties
Matching Methods for Causal Inference with Time‐Series Cross‐Sectional Data
Short versus Long Coalitions
The Hard Business of Balancing Budgets
Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments
Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2000
Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |