Domestic political determinants of inflation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6259255 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Motoshi Suzuki (0000-0002-0704-2620, University of North Texas, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 245-259 |
| Publication date | 1993-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Political Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0304-4130 • E-ISSN: 1475-6765 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1993.tb00358.x |
| OpenAlex | W2023686404 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 29 |
Political economists have advanced a variety of diverse and competing hypotheses to explain the domestic political dimension of inflation. With few exceptions, however, these hypotheses have been tested individually without regard to competing explanations. This study uses pooled time‐series data on fifteen industrial democracies to examine five prominent political hypotheses that purport to explain either political pressures that cause inflation or institutional arrangements that insulate governments from these pressures. The results indicate that: (1) Central Bank independence provides an effective counterweight to inflation by insulating monetary policy making from inflationary (particularly, partisan) impulses; (2) Government spending increases caused by distributive and redistributive politics intensify inflationary pressures even in countries with independent Central Banks and neocorporatist arrangements; (3) Inflation is determined partially by the ideology of the party controlling government. Leftist governments in pursuit of income redistribution produce higher inflation than conservative governments; (4) Elections do not have significant effects on inflation under any structural circumstances; and (5) Neocorporatism does not consistently reduce inflation or contain the inflationary effects of partisan manipulation and fiscal expansion. However, neocorporatism may stop inflation if wage moderation by labour is accompanied by the government's commitment to pursue restrictive monetary policy
Economics · Ideology · Inflation (cosmology · Inflation targeting · Keynesian economics · Macroeconomics · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Redistribution (election · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
The Changing Political Economy of Inflation
Inflation aversion in the European Union
Political parties’ ideological bias and convergence in economic outcomes
Equality and efficiency
Unions, Wages, and the Common Interest
Economic Changes and Government Popularity in Scandinavian Countries
Cooperation and Political Economic Performance in Affluent Democratic Capitalism
Patterns of corporatist policy-making
Monetary Politics
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
The Growth of Government
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game
The Political Business Cycle
Order and conflict in contemporary capitalism
The Private Government of Public Money
Corporatism in Industrial Relations
The American Political Economy
The Rise in Unemployment
Employment Policies and Centralized Wage-Setting
The Politics of Growth
The Political Economy of Economic Growth
Elections and the Fed
Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Political Parties, World Demand, and Unemployment
Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance
The Political Economy of Inflation
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,23 |
| Citation span | 1995 - 2025 (31) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |