Technocrat or partisan cabinet ministers
Does it make a difference? Evidence from an endorsement experiment with the bureaucracy
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6259484 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Marta Batista (0000-0002-2456-4164, Department of Political Science Federal University of Pernambuco (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco) Brazil, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2024 |
| Volumen | 63 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 997-1021 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2024-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | European Journal of Political Research (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0304-4130 • E-ISSN: 1475-6765 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1475-6765.12649 |
| OpenAlex | W4389869319 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 51 |
This article analyses how high‐level bureaucrats evaluate the leadership of technocrat and partisan cabinet ministers in different roles of policymaking. The argument is that bureaucrats perceive ministers with policy expertise to have a central role in policymaking, especially in policy‐directing tasks. Despite their essential contribution to coalition formation, ministers with political experience are negatively evaluated in all policymaking roles. The article presents evidence based on an endorsement experiment conducted with the high‐level bureaucracy in Brazil. The results show that ministers with policy experience receive positive evaluations from the bureaucracy in policy formulation and implementation roles but not to carry out political coordination activities with the presidency or the legislature. Ministers with a partisan profile receive negative evaluations in all tasks of the policy process. Exploring the mechanism, we show that the negative assessment of ministers with a partisan profile is maintained even when the profile of the bureaucrat is considered. These results show the negative attitudes of high‐level bureaucrats towards partisan ministers in contexts of substantial patronage and corruption and contribute to the debate on ministerial appointments and their implications for policymaking
Argument (complex analysis · Bureaucracy · Cabinet (room · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidency · Sociology · Technocracy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Policy Transfer and Learning · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
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| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 2 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |