The consequences of delegation to independent agencies
Separation of powers, discursive governance and the regulation of telecommunications in Germany
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6259673 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Thomas Gehring (0000-0001-6284-2156, University of Bamberg, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 677-698 |
| Publication date | 2004-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Political Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0304-4130 • E-ISSN: 1475-6765 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00170.x |
| OpenAlex | W2150780916 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 39 |
Whereas the delegation of regulatory powers is usually examined from the principal's perspective, this article explores the consequences of delegation for the regulatory output. Empirically, it finds that the dissolution of the original German postal authority led to the establishment of a system of divided labour in which different actors, including an (almost) independent regulatory agency, depend on each other's performance of specialized functions. Theoretically, it contributes to the ongoing debate over the role and operation of independent agencies in two main respects. First, based on the modern theory of social systems, it draws attention to the fact that the reform process was characterized by an increased functional differentiation of institutionalized decision‐making. Second, drawing on the Habermasian theory of communicative action, it is argued that functional differentiation supports the transformation of interaction from interest‐based bargaining to deliberative arguing both in the legislative and the administrative arenas. As political actors are made unable to resort to their power resources, reasons become a key source of influence
Action (physics · Agency (philosophy · Corporate governance · Delegation · Economics · Law and economics · Legislature · Management · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Principal (computer security · Principal–agent problem · Process (computing · Separation of powers · Sociology · Law · Public Administration
Ulysses and the Sirens
The Reason of Rules
Economic Politics
Regulating Europe
Delegating Powers
Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance
Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy
The logic of delegation
A Theory of Justice
The Politics of German Regulation
Interpersonal trust, political trust and non‐institutionalised political participation in Western Europe
Regulatory strategies, delegation and European market integration
The problems of independent agencies in the United States and the European Union
Commission activism
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Institutions, regulation, and change
Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions
Learning from the Americanists (Again)
Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy
Institutional Choice and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Germany
The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems
Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice
Reconstructing the New Regulatory State in Germany
Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies
Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies
Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
Social Theory for a Changing Society
The Cement of Society
Ulysses Unbound
Foundations of Social Theory
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,05 |
| Citation span | 2007 - 2007 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |