On the circumstances of justice

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6259986
AutoresAdam James Tebble (0000-0003-1157-9380, King's College London, autor de correspondencia)
Año2020
Volumen19
Número1
Páginas3-25
Fecha de publicación2020-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEuropean Journal of Political Theory (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1474-8851 • E-ISSN: 1741-2730
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1474885116664191
OpenAlexW2510521851
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas25

An epistemic account of the circumstances of justice allows one to make three important claims about the Humean and Rawlsian ‘standard account’ of those circumstances. First, and contrary to Hume, the possibility and necessity of justice are rooted not in limited beneficence or confined generosity, but in the epistemic insight that the knowledge relevant to deciding what to do with the fruits of social cooperation is for a variety of reasons uncentralisable. Second, and regardless of whether Rawlsian ethical disagreement is more persuasive as a circumstance of justice than Humean confined generosity, it does not explain the possibility and necessity of justice, for the uncentralisability of social knowledge would be decisive even under conditions of unanimity. Finally, the epistemic account not only shows what the circumstances of justice are but, contra Cohen’s critique of the standard account, also provides at least some guidance as to what justice itself may be

Autonomy · Beneficence · Economic Justice · Epistemology · Generosity · Law and economics · Political science · Sociology · Unanimity · Variety (cybernetics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics