Evading the joint decision trap

The Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–20

Bibliographic Data

ID6260740
AuthorsJørgen Stenbæk (University of Copenhagen), Mads Dagnis Jensen (0000-0002-4226-4114, Roskilde University, corresponding author)
Year2016
Volume8
Issue4
Pages615-635
Publication date2016-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1755-7739 • E-ISSN: 1755-7747
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s175577391500020x
OpenAlexW2291115418
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited20

On 8 February 2013, the European Council agreed on the EU’s multiannual financial framework for 2014–20. The agreement includes a reduction of the overall spending level and significant reprioritisations. This paper asks how this agreement has been reached. Scharpf’s actor-centered institutionalism is applied, including the concept of the joint-decision trap. The paper finds that the outcome was made possible by compensating the member states that were worst affected by the policy changes. A coalition of net contributors, centered on Germany and the United Kingdom, was influential regarding the overall spending level. In addition, the external environment with the fiscal and economic crisis created a momentum for reduced expenditures. Those against the reduction, the member states in favour of agriculture and cohesion, were not able to avoid cutbacks. Member states in favour of the cohesion policy faced hard conditions for maintaining unity in their coalition, whereas member states in favour of agricultural spending could more easily negotiate for their common interests

Cohesion (chemistry · Common Agricultural Policy · Economic policy · Economics · European union · International economics · Member states · Negotiation · Political science · Public economics · European Union Policy and Governance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Social Policy and Reform Studies

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