Path Dependence as an Explanation of the Institutional Stability of the German Parliament

Bibliographic Data

ID6262640
AuthorsTracy Hoffmann Slagter, Gerhard Loewenberg
Year2009
Volume18
Issue4
Pages469-484
Publication date2009-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueGerman Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0964-4008 • E-ISSN: 1743-8993
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09644000903349457
OpenAlexW1971186567
LanguageEN
Citations received3

The theory of path dependence identifies sources of institutional stability and change. It emphasises the importance of early, contingent events and increasing returns over time to explain patterns of institutional persistence. Used to describe the evolution of the procedural practices of the German Bundestag, this theory points to the long-term importance of the consensus that developed early in the 1950s among the floor leaders of three dominant parties, which is in stark contrast to the absence of such inter-party consensus in the early years of the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic. Path dependence identifies factors endogenous to the institution to explain how the institution responds to external shocks, such as the entry of new parties. When the Greens and the PDS entered the Bundestag, the established parties responded by accepting their vigorous exercise of minority rights and they accepted the established practice of managing these rights by inter-party consensus

Economics · German · Institution · Institutional change · Law and economics · Neoclassical economics · Parliament · Path (computing · Path dependence · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Weimar Republic · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · History · Law · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies

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