Binding hands as a strategy for economic reform

Government by commission

Bibliographic Data

ID6262654
AuthorsKenneth Dyson (0000-0002-6162-8729, Cardiff University, corresponding author)
Year2005
Volume14
Issue2
Pages224-247
Publication date2005-06-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueGerman Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0964-4008 • E-ISSN: 1743-8993
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09644000500154557
OpenAlexW2035394444
LanguageEN
Citations received14

This article explores the role of the strategy of binding hands, its paradoxical use as both a constraint and as a source of leadership power over economic reform in Germany, its contested nature, how it is embedded in systemic characteristics of German politics, the ambivalence between binding in as strategy and binding in as legacy, and the role of unanticipated consequences. In a political system that offers great opportunities to veto players, there are powerful systemic incentives to seek out and use external discipline. However, like Europeanisation, government by commission has proved a very imperfect device for controlling domestic policy processes. It has had complex, differentiated effects on German economic reform. These effects are shaped by the structural privileging of certain ideas in economic policy; the skills of leaders in negotiating this context and seeking out and using opportunities to enhance the credibility of reform through pre-commitment, including strategic sequencing; the various factors that influence how credible binding hands is judged by elites, publics and markets; and the role of policy dynamism and unanticipated consequences

Business · Commission · Government (linguistics · Political science · European Union Policy and Governance · Finance · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub