Welfare bias in the party system

A neo-Downsian explanation for gridlock in economic reform

Bibliographic Data

ID6262913
AuthorsStephen Padgett (corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume13
Issue2
Pages360-383
Publication date2004-01-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueGerman Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0964-4008 • E-ISSN: 1743-8993
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0964400042000248232
OpenAlexW2052170577
LanguageEN
Citations received6

Employing neo-Downsian theory, the article seeks a party system explanation for the difficulties experienced by political actors in seeking to reform the declining German economy. Taking the UK as a comparator, it investigates the linkages between voter preferences, party positions and government programmes in relation to the market economy and welfare. Whilst the main German parties have recently leapfrogged their UK counterparts in the emphasis placed on the market economy, there is still a ‘welfare bias’ that inhibits them from adopting sharply defined market positions. Welfare bias is attributed to voter preferences, and, in particular, to the diffuse distribution of voter preferences across the party system

Distribution (mathematics · Economic policy · Economics · German · Government (linguistics · Gridlock · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Welfare · Welfare reform · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Social Policy and Reform Studies

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