The Limits of Regulation

Indirect Party Access to State Resources in Australia and the United Kingdom

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6264356
AutoresNicole Bolleyer (0000-0002-2393-3757, University of Exeter), Anika Gauja (0000-0001-6691-9421, The University of Sydney)
Año2015
Volumen28
Número3
Páginas321-340
Fecha de publicación2015-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaGovernance (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/gove.12090
OpenAlexW2170880150
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas29

The way in which political parties use state resources indirectly (e.g., parliamentary expenses) receives substantial attention in public debate, particularly when surrounded by perceptions of misuse. However, scholarly studies of resources indirectly available to parties through their functions in the state, how they are used and regulated, are rare. This article presents an analytical framework that identifies and categorizes the range of indirect resources linked to parties' institutional roles. It locates these resources within a four‐fold matrix of regulation, distinguishing regimes that vary in their detail and whether compliance is externally monitored. Undertaking comparative case studies of parliamentary resource use in the United Kingdom and Australia, we argue that the blurring of party‐political and parliamentary roles can impede the effectiveness of regulatory regimes that democracies adopt, regardless of detail and external enforcement. These findings have important implications for regulatory reforms that seek to constrain parties' behavior to depoliticize democratic governance

Business · Corporate governance · Democracy · Economics · Enforcement · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Regulatory state · Resource (disambiguation · State (computer science · Computer Science · Law · Policy Transfer and Learning · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Finance