The politics of state compliance with international “soft law” in finance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6264709 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lucia Quaglia (0000-0001-8816-0583, University of Bologna, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 45-62 |
| Publication date | 2019-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Governance (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/gove.12344 |
| OpenAlex | W2794831744 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 31 |
Why do jurisdictions comply (or not) with international soft law in finance? This research systematically links international and domestic explanations of compliance by highlighting the “disjuncture” between the international standard‐setting process and the process of domestic compliance. Two causal mechanisms that affect compliance are identified. In the uploading stage, elected officials delegate the making of international soft law to domestic regulators; large, internationally active financial institutions mobilize extensively and, to a large extent, successfully. In the downloading stage, domestic interest groups team up with elected officials in order to resist compliance with international soft law that has negative distributional implications for domestic constituencies. These arguments are illustrated through a structured, focused comparison, and process tracing of the mixed record of compliance of the two main jurisdictions worldwide—the United States and the European Union—with the main international banking standards, the Basel Accords
Business · Compliance (psychology · Delegate · European union · Europeanisation · Hard law · International law · International trade · Political science · Politics · Soft law · State (computer science · Global Financial Regulation and Crises · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Accounting · Finance
Bridging accountability gaps
Why Do Eastern African Countries Comply With OECD Tax Norms? How Network Effects Shape Policy Transfer in Anti‐Profit Shifting Governance
The power of the banking lobby and its consequences
Legitimising EU Governance through Performance Assessment Instruments
Globalizing from the inside out
The domestic compliance system and compliance barriers
Regulators and the quest for coherence in finance
The non‐reversal of delegation in international standard‐setting in finance
Regulatory Convergence in the Financial Periphery
Understanding self‐regulation for political control and policymaking
The Politics of Global Regulation
The New Global Rulers
Governing Finance
Explaining cosmetic compliance with international regulatory regimes
From failure to failure
The new interdependence approach
Sequence as explanation
Transnational feedback, soft law, and preferences in global financial regulation
Black Swans, Lame Ducks, and the mystery of IPE's missing macroeconomy
Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
Leveraged interests
Capitalist diversity and the international regulation of hedge funds
Regulating globally, implementing locally
Banking on Stability
Political mobilization, veto players, and WTO litigation
Losing abroad but winning at home
Domestic drivers of transgovernmental regulatory cooperation
The “Europeanization” of the Basel process
Noisy business politics
Capital Rules
The Concept of Legalization
Diplomacy and domestic politics
The International Politics of Harmonization
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation
The Reductionist Gamble
Dispute settlement in world politics
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,25 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |