International court curbing in Geneva
Lessons from the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6264880 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mark A Pollack (0000-0002-3990-8337, Department of Political Science Temple University Philadelphia Pennsylvania United States, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 23-39 |
| Publication date | 2023-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Governance (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/gove.12686 |
| OpenAlex | W4220987403 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 14 |
The 21st century has witnessed a backlash against many international courts (ICs). Studies of IC backlash have generally taken an optimistic tack, noting that most courts have survived backlash intact or—in the case of the paralyzed Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO)—are likely to do so after a temporary period of slumber. In this context, this paper analyzes the United States' successful effort to paralyze the AB, deriving lessons from this deviant case of backlash against one of the world's most active and independent ICs. Undertaken in the context of the “Reversing Delegation” research project, this account is organized in five parts. First, I demonstrate that the creation of the AB was a classic instance of delegation of dispute‐settlement power, and that the AB quickly emerged as an active agent of trade liberalization. Second, I explore the roots of politicization, noting that dissatisfaction with AB jurisprudence preceded the Trump administration, although Trump's delegitimation of the AB was more far‐reaching than that of his predecessors. Third, I examine the administration's use of the veto power to paralyze the AB, an act of de facto de‐delegation. Fourth, I assess the pushback from the many other WTO members that sought to defend the AB, showing how they failed to blunt the US campaign. Fifth, I analyze the remarkably successful outcome of the US attack, and draw lessons for judicial independence and the rule of law in international politics
Adjudication · Context (archaeology · Delegation · Economics · International court · International law · Jurisprudence · Law and economics · Multilateralism · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Public international law · International Arbitration and Investment Law · Law · Ombudsman and Human Rights · World Trade Organization Law
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| Citations per year | 2.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |