The Constitutional Position of an Independent Central Bank
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6266554 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Charles Goodhart (0000-0003-0413-2898, London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author), C A E Goodhart |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 190-210 |
| Publication date | 2002-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Government and Opposition (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0017-257X • E-ISSN: 1477-7053 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1477-7053.00094 |
| OpenAlex | W1968995218 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 9 |
In 1989 The Reserve Bank Of New Zealand Act Gave The Rbnz the operational independence to vary monetary instruments, in particular to control the level of short-term money market rates, in such a way as to hold inf lation within a stated range over a stated period of time. That numerical range and period were to be agreed in a contractual arrangement between the Minister of Finance and the Governor, and the Governor was to be held personally responsible for achieving those agreed objectives
Business · Central bank · Control (management · Economics · Financial system · Governor · Independence (probability theory · Management · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Money market · Period (music · Position (finance · Range (aeronautics · Statistics · Economic Theory and Policy · Economic, financial, and policy analysis · Engineering · Finance · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Mathematics
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,17 |
| Citation span | 2008 - 2026 (19) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |