Strategic Institutional Design
Two Case Studies of Non-Majoritarian Agencies in Health Care Priority-Setting
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6266980 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Claudia Landwehr (0000-0002-0814-3028), Katharina Böhm (0000-0001-9116-3945) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 632-660 |
| Publication date | 2016-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Government and Opposition (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0017-257X • E-ISSN: 1477-7053 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/gov.2014.37 |
| OpenAlex | W2154260955 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 34 |
Governments’ decisions to delegate policy decisions to non-majoritarian agencies have been both criticized as attempts at blame avoidance or depoliticization and defended as enhancing the rationality and credibility of decisions. This article focuses not on the decision to delegate, but on the decisions of how and to whom to delegate. We argue that strategic motives are relevant not only in the decision to delegate, but equally, and perhaps more importantly, in the selection of the institutional properties of these non-majoritarian agencies. We present two case studies of health care priority-setting, in England and Germany, to illustrate how governments proceed strategically in institutional design choices and how their decisions affect outcomes
Blame · Business · Credibility · Delegate · Economics · Political science · Rationality · Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life · Healthcare Systems and Challenges · Law · Psychology · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies · Social Psychology
Institutions and Social Conflict
Delegation in the Regulatory State
From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes
The Politics of Government Decision-Making
Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance
The Rise and Decline of Nations
Depoliticizing Democracy
Priority setting in health care
Depoliticisation
What explains ‘generosity’ in the public financing of high-tech drugs? An empirical investigation of 25 OECD countries and 11 controversial drugs
Cages of reason
An agenda for the study of institutions
The Role of Political Ideology in the Structural Design of New Governance Agencies
Arm’s Length but Hands On’. Mapping the New Governance
Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited
Regulation after delegation
Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions
Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty
The Formal Independence of Regulators
Power and Political Institutions
A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics
Decision Rules, Decision Styles and Policy Choices
Trends in the Public Sector
Explaining the Accountability of Independent Agencies
From the Positive to the Regulatory State
The Politics of Blame Avoidance
Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies
Delegation and Institutional Design in Health‐Care Rationing
Why Do Governments Delegate Authority to Quasi-Autonomous Agencies? The Case of Independent Administrative Authorities in France
Cages of Reason
Rethinking depoliticisation
| Citations per year | 0.25 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2020 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |