Institutions for Flying
How States Built a Market in International Aviation Services
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6268093 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John E Richards (0000-0002-8283-4468, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 993-1017 |
| Publication date | 2001-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Organization (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8183 • E-ISSN: 1531-5088 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1162/002081801317193673 |
| OpenAlex | W2102451524 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
In the aftermath of World War II, states created a complex set of bilateral and multilateral institutions to govern international aviation markets. National governments concluded bilateral agreements to regulate airport entry and capacity and delegated to the airlines, through the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the authority to set fares and the terms of service in international markets. The resulting mixture of public and private institutions produced a de facto cartel that lasted for more than thirty years. Consistent with the Rational Design framework put forth by Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, I argue that the institutions states created reflect the bargaining and incentive problems generated by international aviation markets. This case provides support for four of the Rational Design conjectures and slightly contradicts three others
Aeronautics · Air transport · Aviation · Business · Cartel · De facto · Economics · Incentive · International trade · Market economy · Political science · Service (business · Aviation Industry Analysis and Trends · Engineering · International Law and Aviation · Law · Marketing
How International Law Works
Delegation and pooling in international organizations
Ordering global governance complexes
Malaysia–Singapore airspace dispute, 2018–2019
National politics and international agreements
Flying flags
Open skies, closed markets
The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties
The Limits of “Rational Design
Design in Context
Moving Forward, One Step at a Time
Rational design in motion
| Citations per year | 0.48 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2001 - 2024 (24) |
| Highly cited | No |