Toward a Positive Theory of International Institutions
Regulating International Aviation Markets
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6268367 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John E Richards (0000-0002-8283-4468, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-37 |
| Publication date | 1999-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Organization (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8183 • E-ISSN: 1531-5088 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1162/002081899550797 |
| OpenAlex | W2008732657 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 28 |
| References cited | 28 |
The regulation of postwar international aviation markets suggests that existing approaches to international institutions cannot adequately account for important elements of international institution building. In particular, scholars have neglected how domestic politics shapes the incentives of national governments to create and maintain international institutions and the impact of domestic politics on the scope and functions of international institutions. Drawing on positive theories of regulation and the literature on property rights, I argue that national politicians use international institutions to increase the wealth available for domestic redistribution. In short, national politicians create and maintain international institutions to maximize domestic political support. I present a domestic political model that explains how, when, and why national politicians create international institutions. The model is applied to the creation of institutions governing international aviation markets in the late 1940s and the reformulation of these institutions over the past two decades
Aviation · Economic system · Economics · Incentive · Institution · International relations · International trade · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Redistribution (election · Scope (computer science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Engineering · International Labor and Employment Law · International Law and Aviation · Law
The Origins of Informality
International Security Institutions
International Political Economy
Open economy politics
Diffusion of norms in a developing country
Sharing Transboundary Resources
What Are International Institutions
The geographic impact of ‘open skies’ policies on Trans‐Tasman air passenger service
Open skies, closed markets
Managing tied aid competition
TRIPs across the Atlantic
Governing lipitor and lipstick
Making global markets
European Integration and Labour Market Cooperation
Varieties of cooperation
Colluding victims
Building Transnational Civil Liberties
The European regulatory state and global public policy
The Regulation of Transnational Corporate Identity in Europe
When digital taxes come due
In Whose Interest? Pressure Group Politics, Economic Competition and Environmental Regulation
Putting the EU in its place
Bringing the Offshore Ashore
Making Rules for Global Finance
The Limits of “Rational Design
Technological revolution meets policy and the market
International interdependence and regulatory power
Theory is dead, long live theory
Economic Analysis of Property Rights
The Political Economy of International Relations
The Rise of the Western World
Black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory
An economic theory of democracy
After Hegemony
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Double-Edged Diplomacy
Politics in hard times
The Logic of Collective Action
Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Constitutions and Commitment
Federalism, Chinese Style
Global Communications and National Power
Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy
The international telecommunications regime
Regimes, power, and international aviation
Coordination and collaboration
The demand for international regimes
The second face of hegemony
Redistributive Cooperation
Cave! hic dragones
International law and domestic institutions
The Origins of Central Banking
The Politics of International Aviation
The Political Economy of Group Membership
Contra Contractarianism
| Unique citing works | 28 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,17 |
| Citation span | 2002 - 2026 (25) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 28 |