Theory and Method in the Study of International Negotiation

A Rejoinder to Oran Young

Bibliographic Data

ID6271060
AuthorsAndrew Moravcsik, Andrew M Moravcsik (0000-0003-3892-7568, corresponding author)
Year1999
Volume53
Issue4
Pages811-814
Publication date1999-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Organization (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-8183 • E-ISSN: 1531-5088
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1162/002081899551084
OpenAlexW2032492620
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited1

Under what conditions do officials in international organizations wield influence as informal political entrepreneurs? Two conditions, I argue in the article under discussion, must obtain: First, an asymmetry in the availability of information or ideas must impede national governments from negotiating Pareto-efficiently. High transaction costs, relative to gains, must induce a coordination failure. Actors able to provide the three essential entrepreneurial functions—initiatives, mediation, mobilization—must be scarce. Second, international officials must enjoy or be accorded privileged access to the information or ideas necessary to act as entrepreneurs and induce more efficient interstate bargains. Where either of these two conditions is absent, third-party entrepreneurial activities are likely to be redundant (because states, as stakeholders, would have greater means and incentives to act as entrepreneurs) or futile (because a consensual support among states would not be forthcoming anyway

Business · Database transaction · Economics · Incentive · Information asymmetry · Law and economics · Mediation · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Pareto principle · Political science · Politics · Public relations · State (computer science · Transaction cost · European Union Policy and Governance · Finance · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law

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