A Preference for War
How Fairness and Rhetoric Influence Leadership Incentives in Crises
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6274331 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Matthew S Gottfried (United States Department of State), Robert F Trager, Robert Trager (0000-0002-6201-2811, University of California, Los Angeles) |
| Ano | 2016 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 243-257 |
| Data de publicação | 2016-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | International Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/isq/sqv025 |
| OpenAlex | W2318361986 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 30 |
| Referências citadas | 108 |
We conduct a survey experiment to examine the effects of international compromise, war, and foreign government rhetoric on presidential approval. We find that, in certain conflicts, popular approval tracks fairness heuristics—leaders seeking to maximize voter approval prefer equitable divisions of disputed goods and are risk acceptant for divisions below this threshold. Moreover, aggressive rhetoric by a foreign leader increases domestic leaders’ expected approval from war, decreases the value of compromise, and provides them with powerful incentives to fight harder. Thus, leaders motivated by popular approval have preferences that are inconsistent with the non-satiated, risk-averse preferences defined over shares of an objective good—that is, with those that much of the rationalist literature on conflict assumes. Fairness heuristics and the rhetorical framing of disputes during the conflict process may be at least as important as material factors in understanding why some disputes result in war
Compromise · Economics · Framing (construction · Government (linguistics · Heuristics · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Persuasion · Political science · Positive economics · Preference · Presidential system · Public relations · Rhetoric · Rhetorical question · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Economic Policies and Impacts · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology
Statements of Resolve
Brexit identities and British public opinion on China
The Meddling American Voter? How Norms, Interests, and Great Power Rivalries Affect U.S. Public Support for Partisan Electoral Interventions Abroad
The Limits of Institutions and the Reliance on Heuristics during the Covid-19 Pandemic
Gender, Events, and Elite Messages in Mass Opinion on Foreign Relations
Aims, claims, and the bargaining model of war
Limits of engagement? The sunshine policy, nuclear tests, and South Korean views of North Korea 1995–2013
When Fairness is Unfair
Moral Hazard
Concessions for Concession’s Sake
When Do Imposed Sanctions Work? The Role of Target Regime Type
What’s Fair in International Politics? Equity, Equality, and Foreign Policy Attitudes
Signaling under the Security Dilemma
Coercion and Provocation
Provocation, Bargaining, and War
Foreign Policy as Pork-barrel Spending
Provocation, Public Opinion, and International Disputes
No Fair! Distinguishing Between the Pursuit of Status and Equity in International Relations
Not So Dangerous? Nationalism and Foreign Policy Preference
Reacting to the Olive Branch
Fair Share? Equality and Equity in American Attitudes Toward Trade
The Suffragist Peace
A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs
Resources and Territorial Claims
The influence of foreign elite rhetoric
How Political Psychologists Think
The Diplomacy of War and Peace
Hawks, Doves, and Peace
Anger and Political Conflict Dynamics
Domestic Distributional Roots of National Interest
The R Book
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion
In Time of War
Paying the Human Costs of War
A Constructed Peace
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments
Theorizing States’ Emotions1
Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics
Monkeys reject unequal pay
Estimating regression models with unknown break‐points
Thinking through uncertainty
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
The weirdest people in the world?
An economic theory of democracy
Leaders and International Conflict
Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts
Origins of Containment
The Logic of Political Survival
Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior under Conventional Arbitration
Beyond Homo economicus
How the scope of a demand conveys resolve
The role of hostile communications in a crisis simulation game
Long-Term Consequences of Aggressive Diplomacy
Procedural Justice in Negotiation
Distributive justice and the durability of peace agreements
When Right Makes Might
The Deception Dividend
What Are We Talking about When We Talk about No-Voice Procedures? On the Psychology of the Fair Outcome Effect
Assessing the President
War Stories
Rational Deterrence
A Comparison of Hostile Behavior of Decision-Makers in Simulate and Historical Data
Rational Deterrence Theory
On the Evolutionary Origin of Prospect Theory Preferences
Making Sense of Isolationism
When Backing Down Is the Right Decision
Diplomatic Signaling among Multiple States
Drafting Support for War
Framing, Uncertainty, and Hostile Communications in a Crisis Experiment
The Implications of Prospect Theory for Human Nature and Values
Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research
Revealing Preferences
Going Private
The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President's Use of Force
Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations
Transforming Competitive or Cooperative Climates
Equality Matters
Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations
The Personal Touch
Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory
The Pretty Prudent Public
The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon
Multidimensional Diplomacy
Anarchy in international relations theory
Uncommon Ground
Rationalist explanations for war
Anarchy is what states make of it
The Politics of Risking Peace
War as a Commitment Problem
Let's Argue
The Illusion of Democratic Credibility
Taking Preferences Seriously
International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders
Strategic Misspecification in Regression Models
The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining
How do I judge my outcome when I do not know the outcome of others? The psychology of the fair process effect
Retaliation as a means of restoring equity
Status Competition and Territorial Aggression
Democracy, Deception, and Entry into War
Audience Costs
Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms
Consensus-seeking, distrust and rhetorical entrapment
The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment
Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations
Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining
Fairness Considerations in World Politics
Progress in Behavioral Game Theory
Anomalies
Anomalies
Towards an understanding of inequity
Efficient Secrecy
Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict
The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War
Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting
Ideas & Foreign Policy
The President and the Political Use of Force
The Politics of Presidential Speechmaking, 1949-1980
Presidential Influence in the House
Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
Reading Habermas in Anarchy
When Do Fair Beliefs Influence Bargaining Behavior? Experimental Bargaining in Japan and the United States
| Obras citantes distintas | 30 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 3 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 30 |