Compromesso astorico
The role of the Senate after the Italian constitutional reform
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6277316 |
|---|---|
| Authors | George Tsebelis (0000-0003-0889-8153, University of Michigan, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 87-104 |
| Publication date | 2017-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-8402 • E-ISSN: 2057-4908 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/ipo.2016.21 |
| OpenAlex | W2519102842 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 24 |
The article examines the content of the constitutional amendments with respect to the Senate. While symmetric bicameralism would be abolished with respect to policymaking, it would be preserved and even exacerbated with respect to constitutional revisions. The consequences of the first would be a reduction of the number of institutional veto players, which would lead to the facilitation of policy change, and an increase in the power of the government (who is the agenda setter). The content of the new policies remains unknown, as are the economic consequences of the proposed changes. Constitutional revisions would become more difficult, because the ideological distance between the Chamber of Deputies and Senate would be likely to increase (because of the mode of selection of Senators), while article 138, which specifies the requirements for amendment to the constitution, would remain the same. As a result, the role of the Italian Constitutional Court would also likely increase
Constitution · Constitutional amendment · Constitutional economics · Constitutional law · Constitutional review · Economics · Government (linguistics · Ideology · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Separation of powers · Setter · Veto · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · History · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Public Administration
If you really love nothing. Evaluating second-order factors in the case of Italian constitutional referendum of 2020
‘I missed a penalty’
What kind of veto player is the Italian Senate? A comparative analysis of European second chambers
Italy says no
Political consequences of conspiratorial thinking
The time inconsistency of long constitutions
Useless approvals’. Italian bicameralism and its decisional capacity
Was Mattarella worth the trouble? Explaining the failure of the 2016 Italian constitutional referendum
Bicameralism and Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion
Constitutional Rigidity Matters
The Determinants of Judiciary Independence
Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies
The Architecture of Government
The Federalist
Bicameralism
Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies
Fiscal Expansions and Adjustments in OECD Countries
The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth
Veto Players
Policy Volatility, Institutions, and Economic Growth
Fiscal forecasts and political systems
Did Jefferson or Madison understand Condorcet's theory of social choice
Does Policy Stability Increase the Constitutional Court's Independence? The Case of Italy During the First Republic (1956–1992)
Rules Rather than Discretion
Unbundling Institutions
International Regimes, Domestic Veto-Players, and Capital Controls Policy Stability
Votes and Vetoes
Institutions and Investors
Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries
Veto Points, Veto Players, and International Trade Policy
Veto Players and the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies
Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,11 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2024 (8) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |