When Practice Goes beyond Legislators' Expectations

Analysis of Practical Implementation Exceeding Legal Compliance with EU Directives

Bibliographic Data

ID6282178
AuthorsAsya Zhelyazkova (0000-0002-8504-949X, Radboud University Nijmegen, corresponding author), Cansarp Kaya (0000-0003-1746-113X, ETH Zurich), Reini Schrama (0000-0001-8334-4244, ETH Zurich)
Year2018
Volume56
Issue3
Pages520-538
Publication date2018-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/jcms.12637
OpenAlexW2762334326
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited35

Whereas most research focuses on non‐compliant implementation, we lack understanding of implementers' incentives and abilities to outperform national legislation. This study investigates a largely under‐researched question: to what extent practical implementation exceeds levels of legislative compliance with EU requirements? To explain this phenomenon, we focus on the responsiveness of implementing actors to external (participation in transnational networks) and domestic pressures (national societal attitudes) for compliance with EU requirements and the availability of additional expertise at the implementation stage (bottom‐up). Moreover, implementing actors are unlikely to respond in the same way to different types of national legislative problems (top‐down). The findings suggest that implementers often outperform the transposition of EU laws. Practical outperformance depends on the level of societal support for external policies and is a response to incomplete or ambiguous domestic formal rules

Business · Compliance (psychology · Economics · Law and economics · Political science · Accounting · European Union Policy and Governance · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Psychology · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Social Psychology

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