The Limits of EU Market Power in Migration Externalization
Explaining Migration Control Provisions in EU Preferential Trade Agreements
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6282546 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paula Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik (0000-0003-4784-0421, Department of Political Science and International Relations University of Geneva Geneva, corresponding author), Sandra Lavenex (0000-0002-8769-4492, Department of Political Science and International Relations University of Geneva Geneva), Philipp Lutz (0000-0003-2373-0180, Department of Political Science and International Relations University of Geneva Geneva) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 1351-1378 |
| Publication date | 2024-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/jcms.13563 |
| OpenAlex | W4388774678 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 30 |
The European Union (EU) increasingly seeks cooperation with transit and sending countries to prevent irregular migration and enforce returns. Yet, these countries have little incentives to engage in such cooperation. To overcome interest asymmetries, the EU has sought to link trade and migration control in its preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Drawing on a comprehensive dataset of migration provisions in all PTAs signed between 1960 and 2020 and a qualitative analysis of key policy documents, we show that the inclusion of such provisions does not follow patterns of interdependence and strategic priorities resulting from problem pressure. Rather, the proliferation of migration control provisions in EU PTAs is best explained by the institutional framework guiding the negotiation of these provisions. Whilst reflecting the political will to use PTAs as a ‘carrot’ to incite third‐country cooperation, these findings also show the limits of targeted action on migration control via commercial policies
Business · Control (management · Economic geography · Economics · European union · Externalization · Incentive · Inclusion (mineral · International economics · International trade · Irregular migration · Market economy · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · European Union Policy and Governance · Global trade and economics · Migration and Labor Dynamics
The relational dimension of externalizing border control
Expanding, Complementing, or Substituting Multilateralism? EU Preferential Trade Agreements in the Migration Regime Complex
Migration Diplomacy in World Politics
Double two-level games and international negotiations
Concentric circles of flexible ‘EUropean’ integration
Migration and the Externalities of European Integration
The EU's ‘return rate’ with third countries
Shifting up and out
Market power Europe
Our size fits all
The European Union as a conflicted trade power
The Europeanization of Refugee Policies
Speaking with one voice? The European Union's global approach to migration and mobility and the limits of international migration cooperation
Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy
Estimating logit models with small samples
Expanded Trade and GDP Data
Beyond Trade
Mostly in its Backyard
Trade Agreements as Venues for ́Market PowerEurope ́? The Case of Immigration Policy
Trading Human Rights
The Limits of Unilateral Migration Control
Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics
The untapped potential of preferential trade agreements for climate governance
The 'external dimension' of EU immigration and asylum policy
Political opportunities, not migration flows
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |