Offense–Defense Balance, War Duration, and the Security Dilemma
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283340 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marco Nilsson (0000-0002-1240-4323, University of Gothenburg, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 467-489 |
| Publication date | 2012-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002712438350 |
| OpenAlex | W2117424631 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 36 |
The systemic offense–defense theory argues that the security dilemma and the risk of war become doubly severe in offense-dominant eras in the state system. However, the theory assumes in support of its main argument that wars are shorter when offense has the advantage. This article empirically tests the expected connection between the systemic offense–defense balance and war duration. A statistical analysis of wars 1817–1992 disconfirms the theory’s expectations. The article then draws different conclusions about the severity of the security dilemma when offense is dominant: both arms racing and the fear of aggression that the security dilemma thrives on should be less severe than offense–defense theorists assume
Aggression · Argument (complex analysis · Balance (ability · Criminology · Dilemma · Duration (music · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Security Dilemma · State (computer science · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Medicine · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology
Offense and defense in the international system
Política entre las naciones
Causes of War
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
War and Change in World Politics
Conventional Deterrence
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
Win, Lose, or Draw
Man, the State, and War
Peace and War
Event History Modeling
Must War Find a Way
Predicting the Length of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War
Revisiting Predictions of War Duration
The Promise of Institutionalist Theory
Grasping the Technological Peace
Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984
What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It
Victory Misunderstood
Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance
The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory
Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War
The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War
The Causes of Peace and Conditions of War
Cooperation under the Security Dilemma
Why Cooperation Failed in 1914
Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory
Offense-Defense Theory
The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology
How Initiators End Their Wars
Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics
The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985
Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,4 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |