Insiders versus Outsiders

Preferential Trade Agreements, Trade Distortions, and Militarized Conflict

Bibliographic Data

ID6283473
AuthorsTimothy M Peterson (0000-0003-1159-4898, University of South Carolina, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume59
Issue4
Pages698-727
Publication date2015-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002713520483
OpenAlexW2153834498
LanguageEN
Citations received13
References cited44

A growing literature examines the link between preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and peace among member states. However, despite the potentially competitive nature of these agreements, there has been little research examining whether and how PTAs could induce hostilities between members and nonmembers. In this article, I argue that dyadic conflict is more likely when one dyad member’s exclusive PTA with a third party results in lower exports for the dyad member that is excluded from the agreement. Importantly, I contend that trade creating as well as trade diverting PTAs can have this effect. I use a triadic extension of the gravity model of trade to estimate how an exclusive PTA influences the exports of nonmembers relative to PTA members. Using these estimates in statistical tests of dyadic militarized interstate dispute onset spanning 1961 to 2000, I find that PTA-induced trade distortions are associated with a higher likelihood of conflict between members and nonmembers

Dyad · Economics · European union · International economics · International trade · Member states · Political science · Global trade and economics · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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