Stability and Alliance Cohesion

The Effects of Strategic Arms Reductions on Targeting and Extended Deterrence

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6283500
AutoresFred Chernoff (0000-0001-9450-4821, Colgate University, autor correspondente)
Ano1990
Volume34
Fascículo1
Páginas92-101
Data de publicação1990-03-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002790034001005
OpenAlexW2044375030
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas6
Referências citadas12

There are differences between what the United States says and does with regard to strategic arms. There are also differences between policies that are ideal from a uniquely U.S. perspective and from a broader alliance perspective. These two sets of differences correspond to one another; the latter help to explain the former. Furthermore, recent discussions of arms reduction options, such as Nalebuff (1988), fail to consider the differences between national and alliance points of view. Arguments for minimal deterrence do not account for the damaging effects on alliance relations. A clear understanding of the different perspectives, which consequently pull U.S. policy in different directions, is necessary to see the genuine merits of various options under discussion for future agreements. American alliance commitments help to explain the divergence

Alliance · Cohesion (chemistry · Deterrence theory · Divergence (linguistics · Economics · Ideal (ethics · Law and economics · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Positive economics · Sociology · Computer Science · Law · Philosophy · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics